Education / School Bus Safety Revisited: California Continues the Debate over the Effectiveness of Seat Belts by Christiano, Peter M.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 10
1-1-1999
Education / School Bus Safety Revisited:
California Continues the Debate over the
Effectiveness of Seat Belts
Peter M. Christiano
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Greensheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter M. Christiano, Education / School Bus Safety Revisited: California Continues the Debate over the Effectiveness of Seat Belts, 31
McGeorge L. Rev. 347 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/10
Education
School Bus Safety Revisited: California Continues the Debate
over the Effectiveness of Seat Belts
Peter M. Christiano
Code Sections Affected
Education Code §§ 38047.5, 39831.5 (new), 38048 (amended and
renumbered); Vehicle Code § 27316 (new), § 27316 (repealed).
AB 15 (Gallegos); 1999 STAT. Ch. 648
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 347
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND ........................................ 349
A. California School Bus Safety: Existing Law ................... 349
B. School Bus Safety Laws in Other States ....................... 350
C. Federal School Bus Safety Regulations ........................ 351
ImI. CHAPTER 648 ............................................... 352
A. Seatbelts on All California School Buses ...................... 352
B. Implementing the New Requirements ......................... 353
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW ................................... 353
A. Equipment Safety Standard ................................ 354
B. Chapter 648: All Bark and No Bite? ......................... 355
C. Chapter 648: Do the Benefits Outweigh the Costs? .............. 357
V. CONCLUSION ............................................... 358
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, 1,711 school bus accidents occurred in California, resulting in 314
injuries.' In 1996, the number of accidents rose to 2,048-an increase of only
1. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTs 1996:
SCHOOL Bus COLLISIONS 1 (1999) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL].
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twenty percent-while the number of injuries more than doubled to 769.2 This
disproportionate increase over the past twenty years seems counterintuitive, and
suggests that bus riding presents a threat to the safety of California's children.
Since 1985, the California Legislature has attempted to change school bus
regulations to increase student safety on five separate occasions. All but one bill
failed.4 The only bill to pass was a 1986 law that simply required the California
Highway Patrol to conduct a study on the feasibility of all-belt systems on school
buses.5 That study, which was completed in 1987, found that the evidence
"weigh[ed] against new lap belt policies for Type 1161 school buses." 7 The California
Highway Patrol concluded that the data did not support making such a costly
change to current school bus safety standards!
Despite that finding, Chapter 648 changes the previous safety standard for
school lbuses by adding a combination lap and shoulder belt at all seating positions
and increasing the safety instructions given to pupils.9 Chapter 648 represents the
most significant change to California school bus safety laws in more than fifteen
years.10 California's children will finally get the protection that was proposed by the
Legislature a decade-and-a-half earlier.
2. h.
3. See CAL VEH. CODE § 27316 (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648) (directing the California
Highway Patrol to conduct a study on requiring a belt system on school buses); SB 239 (1997) (as introduced on
Feb. 3, 1997, but not enacted) (attempting to require all buses transporting students to be school buses); AB 3581
(1990) (as introduced on Mar. 1, 1990, but not enacted) (proposing that all school buses be retrofitted with lap
and shoulder belts); AB 2730 (1986) (as introduced on Jan. 21, 1986, but not enacted) (proposing to require all
school buses to meet federal standards within five years, and attempting to direct the California Highway Patrol
to make recommendations on any type of belt system in school buses); AB 4601 (1986) (a3 introduced on Feb.
21, 1986, but not enacted) (trying to prohibit the operation of a motor vehicle for the purpose of transporting
pupils for specified activities, unless the vehicle has lap belts for each passenger).
4. See ASSEMBLYTRANSPORTATIONCOm rEECOMMrTEEANALYSISOFAB 15, at 2-3 (Apr. 5,1999)
(giving the history of similar legislation considered by the California Legislature over the past 15 years).
5. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 329, sec. 1, at 1474 (enacting CAL. VEH. CODE § 27316). Chapter 648 repeals this
obsolete provision and re-enacts it with new subject matter. CAL. VEH. CODE § 27316.
6. See SENATERuLES CoMMrrEE, FLOORANALYSiS oFAB 15, at 5 (Sept. 3,1999) (explaining that lype
I buses are those weighing over 10,000 pounds, while Type 2 buses are those weighing 10,000 pounds or fewer).
7. Booz, ALLEN, & HAMILTON INC., SCHOOL Bus SEAT BELT STuDY 1-3 (1987) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
8. Id. at 5-1 to 5-2.
9. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39831.5 (incorporating 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 277, sec. 5 at 363) (amended
and renumbered by Chapter 648 in 1999); CAL VEH. CODE § 27316 (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648).
10. SENATE RULES COMMIrM, FLOOR ANALYsis OF AB 15, at 4 (Sept. 3, 1999).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. California School Bus Safety: Existing Law
California currently has a number of provisions requiring safety and passenger
restraint systems on school buses' and school pupil activity buses.' 2 The use of
school buses is regulated by the State Board of Education, subject to the safety
requirements of the California Highway Patrol.13 Operating any school bus in
violation of regulations established by the California Highway Patrol is a
misdemeanor. t4 In addition, existing law outlines the procedure for instructing
children on emergency procedures and school bus safety, and explains how to
verify that these instructions were given to comply with the law.'
5
With regard to restraint systems, 6 federal law requires seatbelts only on Type
II school buses, which weigh less than 10,000 pounds.17 The rationale for this
distinction is that when a bus weighing fewer than 10,000 pounds is involved in an
accident, the injuries that result can be as severe as those in accidents involving
passenger cars.' lype I buses, however, are those weighing more than 10,000
pounds.' 9 These buses were not required to be retrofitted with seat belts because
they are heavier, experience less force on impact and distribute the impact forces
better than smaller vehicles.2
11. See CAL.. EDUC. CODE § 39830 (West Supp. 2000) (defining school bus to be any motor vehicle used
to transport students who are in the twelfth grade or below, except: a motor vehicle carrying the owner's
household members; a passenger vehicle carrying fewer than ten occupants; a vehicle operated by a common
carrier available to the general public; a school pupil activity bus; a vehicle licensed under the Interstate
Commerce Commission; and a vehicle operating under the control of a state hospital).
12. See id. § 3983.1 (West Supp. 2000) (defining school pupil activity bus as a vehicle owned and operated
by a common carrier under a contractual agreement with a school to transport students to or from school or a
school activity within the State).
13. Id. § 39831 (West Supp. 2000).
14. Id. § 39833 (West Supp. 2000).
15. I1& (amended and renumbered by Chapter 648).
16. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.209 (1998) (classifying restraint systems as Type 1, a lap belt for pelvic restraint
only; Type 2, a pelvic and upper torso system to restrain the upper and lower body; and Type 2a, a separate pelvic
and torso system used in conjunction).
17. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.222 (1998) (establishing the federal standard, which has been incorporated by all
states including California, only for school buses which weigh less than 4,536 kilograms as requiring all seating
positions to be equipped with safety restraints meeting the specification of Standards 209-which specifies the
requirements for seat belt assemblies including the type of anchorage, mounting hardware, and belt webbing-and
210-which details the requirements for seat belt anchorages necessary to meet specified tension standards).
18. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Seatbelts on SchoolBuses (visited Sept. 28, 1999)
<http:/www.nhtsa.dot.govlpeopleinjury/buseslpubseatbelt.hmp.html> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (declaring that because of the size of larger buses, the forces that bus passengers experience in crashes
carry much less of an impact than the forces that passengers in cars, light trucks, and vans experience in similar
crashes).
19. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 13, § 1201 (2000).
20. Supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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With respect to passenger cars, existing California law requires that all children
under the age of four or weighing fewer than forty pounds be secured with a child
safety seat.2 Parents must secure children over four-years-old and under sixteen-
years-old using a seat belt system. 2 These provisions illustrate the legislative intent
to stress the need for safe school buses and the importance of using child passenger
restraint systems.23
B. School Bus Safety Laws in Other States
Other states have laws similar to California's school bus safety laws, but only
a few have specific requirements for school bus seat belts. New York was one of
the first states24 to adopt such a statute, mandating that all school buses purchased
after July 1987 be equipped with lap belts and increased seat padding.2 New Jersey
followed suit in 1992, requiring buses to institute similar lap belt and seat padding
requirements.26 Florida recently enacted a similar statute.27 Each state exceeds
federal mandates, which only require a watered-down version of a concept known
as compartmentalization. 8
The concept of compartmentalization was originally developed in a 1967
University of California, Los Angeles, crash test study that recommended using lap
belts, high padded seat backs, and padded seat arms to create a compartment of
safety around each passenger.2 9 The New York, New Jersey, and Florida statutes go
a long way in reaching complete compartmentalization, but no state has truly
compartmentalized, by adding padded seat backs twenty-eight inches high and
21. CAL. VEI. CODE § 27360 (West Supp. 2000).
22. Id. § 27360.5 (West Supp. 2000).
23. Id. § 27364(b) (West Supp. 2000).
24. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Safety Belts in School Buses Offer No Help, NTSB Says, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 199, at Al (explaining that New Jersey and New York have required seat belts on school buses for
years, only recently followed by other states like Florida).
25. N.Y. VEH. &TRAF. LAW § 383(5) (McKinney 1996).
26. See NJ. STAT. AN. § 39:3B-10 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring all school buses to meet 49 C.F.R.
§ 571.222 for lap belt use, and, additionally, to have all seat backs meet the 28-inch standard recommended by
the compartmentalization concept).
27. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 234.051 (West 1998) (allowing a regulatory commissioner to set the safety
standard for school buses at or above the same Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard required in New Jersey).
28. Compare School Bus Research Plan from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 63 Fed.
Reg. 57089-91 (1998) (to be codified at 49 C.FR. § 571) (proposed Oct. 26, 1998) (delineating the NHTSA's
current federal school bus safety standard as being a version of compartmentalization using ".trong, well padded,
well anchored, high backed, closely spaced seats," but no seat belts or padded arm rests), with FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 234.051 (incorporating the seat belt standard used for other motor vehicles and high backed seats, but not
including padded arm rests), and NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:3B-10 (instituting a standard identical to Florida's), and
N.Y. VEst. & TRAF. LAW § 383(5) (developing one of the first school bus seat belt law, which is almost identical
to the laws in Florida and New Jersey).
29. MADISON-ONEIDABOCESSEATBELTSANDSCHOOLBUSES 5-6 (1994) (copy on file with the McGeorgc
Law Review).
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padded arm rests at every seating position in addition to a combination of any type
of seatbelts.30
C. Federal School Bus Safety Regulations
The federal school bus safety standards, promulgated by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), are found in the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard. 3' These regulations cover every component of school buses, from
the hydraulic brake system32 to emergency exits,3 3 and from passenger seating
protection34 to seat belt anchorage assemblies.35 However, these standards are only
recommendations promulgated by the NHTSA based on its own independent
investigations into the field of vehicle safety; states are free to develop their own
standards or to adopt the NHTSA recommendations.
Although the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard does not specifically
address seat belts on Type I school buses, both the NHTSA and the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have conducted independent studies on the
feasibility of seat belts for Type I buses. Although not complete, the NHTSA study
focuses on identifying the current injury-provoking problems, developing testing
procedures to correct the ascertained problems, and applying the tests to various
occupant protection safety systems.37 The NTSB study has been completed, but the
conclusions do not indicate which standard should be applied.38 The NTSB
recognizes that school buses are one of the safest forms of transportation, but also
admits to a need for further protection.39 The study claims that additional lateral
support to protect against passenger side-to-side movement is needed because the
30. See supra note 28 (describing the extent to which compartmentalization has been implemented in these
states).
31. 49 C.F.R. § 571.101-303 (1998).
32. See id. § 571.105 (1998) (requiring school buses utilizing hydraulic brakes to stop within a specific
distance depending on weight and traveling speed).
33. See id. § 571.217 (1998) (specifying the means to make exits readily accessible and easier for children
to use).
34. See id. § 571.222 (1998) (establishing the standard for occupant protection by requiring passenger
seating and restraining barriers in school buses).
35. See id. § 571.210 (1998) (delineating the standard for seat belt assembly anchorages in any motor
vehicle to "insure [the belts'] proper location for effective occupant restraint and to reduce the likelihood of [safety
belt] failure").
36. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, supra note 18 (confirming that states and
localities are free to adopt their own standards for seat belts on large buses, but that any such attempt should
emphasize child safety).
37. School Bus Research Plan from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 63 Fed. Reg. 57089-
91 (1998) (to be codified at49 C.F.R. § 571) (proposed Oct. 26, 1998).
38. National Transportation Safety Board, Abstract of Final Report (visited Nov. 18, 1999) <http://www.
ntsb.gov/Publictn/1999/SIR9904.htmn> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
39. Id.
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majority of injuries occur when passengers are thrown sideways. 4c However, the
study cites a lack of sufficient data and procedures to test the effectiveness of
restraint systems.4' The study also indicates that seat belts may not be necessary if
seats are effectively redesigned to use the compartmentalization concept.42 Finally,
the NTSB recommends that the NHTSA conduct its own study to develop testing
procedures so that appropriate standards can be developed.43 This is exactly what
the NHTSA's study is designed to do.44
III. CHAPrm 648
The purpose of Chapter 648 is to increase protection to the more than 1 million
California school children riding on potentially unsafe buses.45 To accomplish this,
Chapter 648 requires that all school buses purchased or manufactured after the year
2002 meet the new safety standard,46 adds to the duties placed on the State Board
of Education to require students to use the new restraints,47 and expands the
procedpre for educating students about school bus safety.48
A. Seatbelts on All California School Buses
Chapter 648 requires that all school buses manufactured or purchased by school
districts after January 1, 2002, be equipped with a combination pelvic and upper
torso restraint system,49 unless the NHTSA specifically recommends that such a
system not be adopted.50 The restraint system must comply with Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards 2095' and 21052 as those standards exist at the time the
40. li
41. Id.
42. Pdonso-Zaldivar, supra note 24, at Al.
43. Id.
44. School Bus Research Plan from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 63 Fed. Reg. at
57,089-91.
45. SENATE RuL s COMMrrEE, FLOOR ANALYsIs OF AB 15, at 5 (Aug. 3, 1999).
46. CAL VEIL CODE § 27316(a)-(b) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648); see infra Part III.A
(describing the new standard).
47. CAL EDuc. CODE § 38047.5 (enacted by Chapter 648); see infra Part M.B (discussing the new restraint
requirements).
48. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39831.5(aX2)-(3) (amended and renumbered by Chapter 648); see infra text
accompanying notes 59-61 (elaborating on the newly imposed procedures).
49. CAL. VEI. CODE § 27316(a) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648).
50. SeeiU (implying that if the NHTSA recommends against seat belts on school buses, California law will
be amended to comply with the new standard).
51. 49 C.F.R. § 571.209 (1998); see id. (specifying the standard for seat belt assemblie3 including the type
of anchorage, mounting hardware, and belt webbing).
52. See id. § 571.210 (1998) (enumerating the requirements for seat belt anchorages necessary to meet
specified tension standards).
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buses are manufactured. 3 However, Chapter 648 does not provide any penalty for
either a passenger's misuse or failure to use the seat belt system.5 Chapter 648 also
states that school districts should prioritize their purchases of new buses to supply
compliant buses to elementary-level schools first. 5
B. Implementing the New Requirements
Chapter 648 gives the responsibility for instituting the new restraint standard
to the State Board of Education.5 6 Instead of developing a rigid procedure, Chapter
648 grants the Board the power to develop and implement its own method to
accomplish the goals set by the Legislature. 7 Those goals include the proper
restraint of children on school buses in compliance with the aforementioned'
standards. 9
Chapter 648 also requires that students be educated about the proper use of the
passenger restraint system.6 These instructions include education as to the proper
use of the fastening mechanism, placement of the belt on the lap to ensure adequate
protection, circumstances in which the belt must be used and when it may be
released, and placement of the belt when not in use.61 Chapter 648 adds these
instructions to the list of those already required by existing laws that deal with other
aspects of school bus safety and emergency procedures.62
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
Chapter 648 seeks to accomplish important goals in requiring seat belts on
school buses and instituting new safety instructions.63 Over the past twenty years,
the number of crash-related injuries on school buses has increased at a higher rate
than the number of school bus crashes. 64 New safety measures would go a long way
53. CAL. VEI. CODE § 27316(b) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648).
54. Id. § 27316(c) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648).
55. id. § 27316(d) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648).
56. CAL EDUC. CODE § 38047.5 (enacted by Chapter 648).
57. Il
58. Supra Part Ml.A.
59. SENATE RuLES CoMMITrEE, FLOOR ANALYsIs OF AB 15, at 6 (Aug. 3, 1999).
60. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39831.5(a)(3) (incorporating 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 277, see. 5, at 363)
(amended and renumbered by Chapter 648).
61. Id. §39831.5(a)(3)(a)-(d) (incorporating 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 277, sec. 5, at 363) (amended and
renumbered by Chapter 648).
62. Id. §39831.5(a)(2) (incorporating 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 277, sec. 5, at 363) (amended and
renumbered by Chapter 648).
63. See ASSEMBLYIRANSPORTATION CoMmrrEe, CoMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 15, at 2 (Apr. 5, 1999)
(indicating that Chapter 648's author believes that the bill will "reduce driver distraction, improve student
behavior, and reduce injuries to students").
64. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, supra note 1, at 1.
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in reducing that trend.65 In addition, Chapter 648 offers several ancillary, benefits
such as improving student behavior, decreasing driver distraction, and reinforcing
proper safety belt use.66 A properly belted student, after all, cannot get out of his or
her seat to cause trouble for other students. 67 This, in turn, will decrease the amount
of distraction bus drivers face every day, thereby reducing the chances of
distraction-induced bus crashes.68 Requiring safety belts on school buses will also
reinforce to children at an early age the importance of such safety measures, which
might lead to increased use of safety belts in all vehicles later in life.69 Presumably,
increased reliance on safety belts will decrease the number of automobile accidents
involving unrestrained occupants, a significant number of which result in fatalities.
While Chapter 648 does make important changes to California law, the debate
over its effectiveness continues.7" Nobody doubts the need for or the importance of
stringent safety standards relating to the care of the State's children; however,
whether Chapter 648 establishes the best procedure for accomplishing these goals
is unclear. The major concerns over Chapter 648 are whether the Act: (1) utilizes
the most effective equipment safety standard for protecting children;7' (2) corrects
the most dangerous threat to children's safety;72 and (3) allocates the appropriate
amount of money to accomplish these goals. 7
3
A. Equipment Safety Standard
The standard Chapter 648 adopts to accomplish school bus safety may not be
the most appropriate. Authorities vary widely on the appropriate safety standard.
Federal equipment standards recommend seat backs that are only twenty-four
inches high, and do not recommend seatbelts or padded arms on the seats.74
65. SeeSENATERULEs CoMmiT COMIMrrTEEANALYSIS OF AB 15, at 5-6 (Aug. 3, 1999) (claiming that
a passenger restraint system should decrease injuries to students while inside the bus, where a majority of school
bus injuries occur).
66. See MADISON-ONEIDA BocEs, supra note 29, at 4-11 (providing the policy justifications for instituting
a seat belt restraint system on school buses).
67. l. at 4-5.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 11.
70. See Harrison Sheppard, The Safety Zone: School Bus Seat Belt Issue Revived, L.A. TIMES, May 17,
1999, at B2 (quoting a Huntington Beach City School District official concerning the effectiveness of seat belts
on school buses as saying, "I wouldn't want seat belts on the buses I supervise right now, because they're too old
and we don't have the money to replace them").
71. Fee infra Part IV.A (examining some of the problems with the new safety standard chosen to remedy
California's increasing school bus injuries).
72. See infra Part IV.B (addressing whether the new safety standard will in fact remedy California's school
bus problems, and, if it does not, what types of redress will be available for an injured student).
73. See infra Part IV.C (analyzing costs in implementing the new standard and comparing them with the
proposed benefits).
74. See 49 C.FR. § 571.222 (1998) (defining the safety guidelines for school buses as including seat back
heights reaching a certain minimum distance above the seats, but not requiring seat belts or arm rests).
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California complied with this federal standard by instituting twenty-four-inch seat
backs, and will go beyond it with the requirements of Chapter 648. 75 On the other
end of the spectrum, advocates of compartmentalization make the most stringent
safety recommendation, proposing lap belts, high padded seat backs, and padded
seat arms for school buses. 6 No state has yet complied with this recommendation.
Chapter 648 and the seat belt laws of New York, New Jersey, and Florida seek
a middle ground between these extremes, but California's law is on the less
stringent side of the spectrum, as it does not increase seat back height to twenty-
eight inches." California is the first state, however, to require both lap and shoulder
belts on Type I buses.78 Additionally, this safety equipment spectrum may
drastically change when the NHTSA completes its two-year study on the feasibility
of seat belts on school buses sometime in the year 2000.79 Whether Chapter 648 will
meet or exceed this new recommendation, or whether Chapter 648 will be obsolete
even before it takes effect on January 1, 2002, is not yet clear. Nevertheless, the
author of Chapter 648 admits that once the NHTSA releases its study, new
legislation will most likely have to be promulgated in order for California to
comply with the new standard8W
B. Chapter 648: All Bark and No Bite?
Until 2002, California's children will remain at the mercy of prior safety
standards, which have resulted in a steadily increasing injury rate.8 In addition,
once in effect, the Chapter 648 standard will only apply to new buses purchased by
the school districts, and will not affect older buses, 2 perhaps resulting in unsafe
buses being used well after the 2002 effective date of Chapter 648. Even for those
buses in compliance with the standard, Chapter 648 imposes no penalty on the
75. Compare 49 C.F.R. § 571.222 (establishing federal guidelines by mandating seat belts for motor
vehicles, but not applying those rules to Type I school buses), with CAL. VEI. CODE § 27316 (repealed and re-
enacted by Chapter 648) (specifying that all Type I school buses in California must meet safety standards for seat
belt assemblies).
76. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77. See supra Part ILB (explaining the differences between other states' school seat belt laws, the NHTSA
version of compartmentalization, and the UCLA version of compartmentalization).
78. Lynda Gledhill, Davis Signs Bill on School-Bus Seat Belts, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1999, at A21.
79. See School Bus Research Plan from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 63 Fed. Reg.
57089-91 (1998) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571) (proposed Oct. 26, 1998) (outlining the school bus research
plan initiated by the NHTSA to be completed sometime in the year 2000).
80. See Carl Ingram, Bill to Equip School Buses with Safety Belts Signed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at A3
(quoting Governor Gray Davis and Chapter 658's author Assemblymember Martin Gallegos) (stating that
Governor Davis signed Chapter 648 into law with an understanding from Gallegos that a follow up bill may be
necessary to "accommodate the specific findings and recommendations of the upcoming federal study," but
despite that necessity, Gallegos claims Chapter 648 puts California "light years ahead of other states").
81. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAYPATROL, supra note 1, at 1.
82. See CAL VEH. CODE § 27316(a) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648) (stating that only those
buses manufactured or purchased after January 1, 2002, must comply with the new standard).
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school district or bus driver when a student fails to use the supplied seat belt.83 As
long as the bus complies with the new standard and the appropriate safety
instructions are given, no person, school district, or organization will be sanctioned
for a student's misuse of the seat belt system, even if an injury results from the
misuse. 4 The result is that while Chapter 648 was enacted with important goals in
mind, the new law has virtually no bite behind it.
Perhaps a parent of an injured child can sue the school district directly, claiming
that the maintenance standard or method of imparting safety instructions was
inadequate. Chapter 648 contains a provision that excludes all violations of Chapter
648 from being charged by parents where the student fails to use or misuses the
supplied restraints,85 but it does not cover claims based on the State's failure to
provide properly functioning seat belts or its failure to adequately instruct the
student on the belt's use. 6 New York also has a provision attached to its school bus
safety statute that, unlike California's, applies specifically to injuries resulting from
failure to wear a school bus seat belts; it prevents injury claims from being raised
by parents based on the student's failure to wear a supplied seat belt. However, the
New York provision does not extend immunity for a school's failure to maintain the
equipment in operating order.88 Recently, the Court of Appeals of New York-that
State's highest court-upheld this provision by ruling that a student could not
maintain a cause of action based solely on an injury sustained as a result of a school
bus accident in which the child was not wearing the supplied seat belt.89
Unlike New York's law, California's school bus seat belt safety statute only
grants the school district immunity for "violation of the code," 9 and does not
specifically address claims based on the injury that results from that violation.91
Aspects of the California Education Code, however, do address school district
liability by extending liability generally where the pupil is under the direct
supervision of a school district employee.92 This provision also extends liability to
school districts that provide transportation for students, but only where the school
83. Id. § 27316(c) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648). But see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 38047.5 (enacted
by Chapter 648) (requiring the State Board of Education to adopt procedures so that the students are properly
restrained).
84. CAL. VEH. CODE § 27316(c) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648).
85. IdM
86. Mda
87. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813(4) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2000).
88. I.
89. O'Connor v. Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 692 N.Y.S.2d 76,77 (1999).
90. CAL VE. CODE § 27316(c) (repealed and re-enacted by Chapter 648).
91. Compare id. (extending immunity for"violation of the code or any otherregulation adopted thereunder
requiring a passenger to use a passenger restraint system," but not addressing claims regarding injuries), with N.Y
EDUC. LAW § 3813(4) (granting immunity from liability where the injured party was not wearing a supplied safety
belt).
92. CAL CoDE REOs. tit. 13, § 1201 (1999).
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district fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. 93 Courts generally
look to the statute authorizing the school district's actions in determining the
standard of care to apply in any particular suit.94 Therefore, the provisions of
Chapter 648 promulgating the required procedures that the school districts must
follow and the warnings the school districts must give will play a vital role in any
future claim involving a student injured in a school bus accident.
C. Chapter 648: Do the Benefits Outweigh the Costs?
Despite the attractiveness of the school bus safety idea, the need for Chapter
648 may not be quite as great as one might expect. Although the number of injuries
has steadily risen over the past twenty years, the number is still low, with only 769
injuries having occurred, and no fatalities having been suffered, in 1996.95 In fact,
only three school bus-related fatalities have occurred in California over the past
decade, with an average of only nine students killed each year nationally in school
bus accidents.96 With 440,000 schools transporting 23.9 million children a distance
of more than 4.3 billion miles annually across the country, school buses are one of
the safest forms of transportation in the United States.97 These fatality numbers
contrast sharply with a national average of seven children killed per year from
airbags in passenger cars,98 roughly thirty-one children killed per year once they
step off the bus and are either struck by the bus itself or hit by speeding motorists, 99
and approximately 5,000 children killed each year in accidents involving passenger
cars.'4° Nevertheless, every child's life is precious; therefore, legislative efforts and
resources should be directed where they will have the greatest impact. School bus
seat belts may not be the State's best investment.
Considering the comparatively low benefits of increasing the safety equipment
for Type I school buses, the costs associated with that new safety equipment must
be scrutinized to determine if taxpayer money is being well-spent. Although
estimates reflect that the belt system itself will cost just $1,500 to $2,20010 per bus,
93. kd; see also Farley v. El Tejon Unified Sch. Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 371,376,274 Cal. Rptr. 780,783
(1990) (ruling that when a school district provides transportation to students, its agents must exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances).
94. See, e.g., Farley, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 377,274 Cal. Rptr. at 784 (citing California Vehicle Code section
22112, which requires buses to utilize flashing red lights while discharging the pupils, and inquiring into the intent
of the Legislature, in the court's quest to set the standard of care for an injury that occurred when a pupil was hit
by a motorist after the student disembarked from the school bus).
95. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, supra note 1, at 1.
96. Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 24, at Al.
97. School Bus Research Plan from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 63 Fed. Reg. 57089-
02(1998).
98. Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 24, at Al.
99. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, supra note 18.
100. Sheppard, supra note 70, at B2.
101. SENATE RULEs COmmrrrEF, FLOOR ANALYSiS OF AB 15, at 6 (Aug. 3, 1999).
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the cumulative cost for implementing the changes throughout California will be
"substantial." t1z For the 2001-2002 fiscal year, the Legislature estimates that the
cost will be $800,000, and $1.6 million every year thereafter to purchase properly
equipped buses. 03 In addition, the State will have to spend $180,000 per year to
carry out the new school bus safety instructions.1°4 The cost for the safety
instructions admittedly is necessary regardless of the safety measure chosen,
because any new safety provision will require additional instruction and training as
to the proper way to use the new restraints. The uncertainty over of whether these
provisions of Chapter 648 are the best or most appropriate methods, however, calls
into question the appropriateness of the substantial implementation costs that are
predicted to reach the millions. 05
V. CONCLUSION
Safety should always come first. Furthermore, when children are involved, the
costs associated with safety should never be a concern. Which safety standard
should be instituted-for example, standards involving seat belts, higher padded
seat backs, padded arm rests, or some other safety device-is the most important
question. Current studies on this question do not yield answers, because conflicting
opinions remain.'06 While a few states have attempted to answer this question by
mandating lap belts on all Type I buses, 107 the vast majority of states have not yet
dealt with the school bus seat belt problem' t 3 Sometime in the summer of 2000,
when the NHTSA study is released,'t 9 California's law regarding school bus seat
belts will either be hailed as a prototype for other states' legislation, or ridiculed as
incomplete and requiring further legislation.1 Because Chapter 648 will not take
effect until after the NHTSA releases its study, California's school bus seat belt law
will have to wait patiently for the new federal standard' "-as will the children.
102. SENATETRANSPORTATION COMMIrTEE, COMMIITEE ANALYSIS or AB 15, at 3 (June 23, 1999).
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 24, at Al (illustrating the uncertainty that still remains, even after the
NTSB con.cluded its independent study on the issue of seat belts in school buses).
107. Supra Part II.B.
108. See supra text and accompanying note 78.
109. See School Bus Research Plan from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 63 Fed. Reg.
57089-91 (1998) (setting the completion date for the NHTSA report at approximately the middle of 2000).
110. Supra text immediately preceding and accompanying note 80.
111. See supra text accompanying note 80 (indicating that the author of Chapter 648 anticipates that new
legislation will be needed before California can comply with the as-yet-unreleased federal standard).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, many states have required high school students to pass a
statewide exit examination in order to receive a high school diploma.' To a great
extent, these examinations were developed as a response to complaints from
colleges and business leaders that high school graduates lacked the basic skills
necessary to succeed in a postsecondary institution or in the workplace.2 With the
passage of Chapter 1, California joins twenty-one other states to require just such
an examination.3 This Legislative Note will describe the legal background of
Chapter 1,4 detail the provisions of the statute,5 and analyze the potential challenges
to Chapter 1 based on the United States Constitution,6 claims of discrimination,
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.8
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: PRIOR AND EXISTING LAW
For more than twenty years, California has required students to pass a high
school exit examination before receiving a high school diploma.9 In 1977, the
1. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMINATIONS: SETING HIOH
EXPECTATIONS (1998) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The most commonly tested subject matter
areas are reading, writing, and mathematics; some states also test in the areas of science and social studics. Id.
2. Id.; see also Emily Bazar, Students at CSU Short in Two Areas, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 17, 1999, at A9,
available in 1999 WL 4015780 (stating that about 50% of incoming freshmen entering the California State
University system in the fall of 1998 needed remedial work in mathematics and English); Jeff Ristine, CSU Fails
to Reduce Its Freshmen's Remedial Needs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 17, 1999, at B3, available in 1999 WL
4058105 (stating that remediation was needed in English for 47% of entering college freshmen, and in
mathematics for 54%, and quoting State Superintendent of Public Instruction Delaine Eastin as saying thatahigh
school exit examination was among the solutions to the problem); Dan Smith, Class of 2004 Must Pass Test:
Davis Signs 2 School Reform Bills, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 30, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 4433683
(indicating that many of the State's business leaders have complained that many high school graduates lack basic
skills and are not adequately prepared to enter the work world).
3. COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, KEY STATE EDUCATIONAL POLICIES ON K-12
EDUCATION: STANDARDS, GRADUATION, ASSESSMENT, TEACHER LICENSURE, TIME AND ATrENDANCE 7 (1998)
[hereinafter COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. Infira Part 1I
5. Infra Part I.
6. Infra Part W.A.
7. Infra Part IV.B.
8. Infira Part IV.C.
9. See 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 894, sec. 43, at 2702-04 (enacting CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 51215,51216,51217,
51217.5, 51217.7) (requiring students to demonstrate proficiency in basic skills in order to receive a diploma).
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Legislature passed Assembly Bill 65,10 which mandated that all high school
students pass a proficiency test in order to receive their diplomas." In carrying out
this responsibility, individual school districts developed their own tests, aligning
them with their own curricula.12 Prior law also allowed school districts to delay any
examination of a student of limited English proficiency until the student had been
in California schools for two years, and had received at least six months of
instruction in the English language. 3
Existing law continues to require school districts to notify parents annually of
various rights and responsibilities, such as the availability of employment-based
school attendance options within the district, the district's policy on sexual
harassment, and the district's current residency requirements. 4 Existing law also
mandates that school districts offer summer school and supplementary instruction
for students who do not pass locally developed proficiency tests. 5
II. CHAPTER 1
According to the Legislature, the local proficiency standards used by individual
school districts to develop their exit examinations were generally set below high
school academic levels.16 The district-based standards were also inconsistent with
state-adopted content standards.17 Chapter 1 resolves these problems by mandating
that students who graduate from high school demonstrate a higher standard-grade-
level competency-in reading, writing, and mathematics.'
10. Il
I1. Id
12. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serm. ch. 922, sec. 110-111, at 4443-45 (amending CAL EDUC. CODE §§ 51215,
51217).
13. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1310, sec. 1, at 4824-26 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51216(a)).
14. CAL EDUC. CODE § 48980 (amended by Chapter 1).
15. Id § 37252(a) (amended by Chapter 1).
16. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1, see. l(a), at 30; see also Dennis Love & Daniel M. Weintraub, School Exit
Exam Could Test Educators, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 10, 1999, at A01, available in 1999 WL 4278840
(indicating that the local proficiency tests are widely considered to be so easy that they are meaningless).
17. 1999 Cal. Legis. Ser. ch. 1, sec. 1 at 30-31; see also CAL- EDUC. CODE § 60603 (West Supp. 2000)
(defining "content standards" as the specific skills and abilities that all public schools are expected to teach, and
all students are expected to learn); CAL EDUC. CODE § 60602(a)(2) (West Supp. 2000) (calling for the State Board
of Education to develop and adopt a set of statewide, academically rigorous content standards in all major subject
matter areas); CAL EDUC. CODE § 60605(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2000) (mandating that the State Board of
Education adopt standards for reading, writing, and mathematics no later than January 1, 1998); STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION, ENGLISHILANGUAGE ARTS CONTENT STANDARDS FOR CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
KINDERGARTEN THROUGH GRADE 12 (1997) [hereinafter ENGLISH/LANGUAGE ARTS STANDARDS] (providing the
text of the English/Language Arts content standards adopted by the State Board of Education on November 14,
1997); STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, THE MATHEMATICS CONTENT STANDARDS FOR CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, KINDERGARTEN THROUGH GRADE 12 (1997) [hereinafter MATHEMATICS STANDARDS] (providing the
text of the mathematics content standards adopted by the State Board of Education on December 11, 1997).
18. See 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1, sec. l(b), at 30 (declaring the Legislature's intent that the high school
exit examination test grade-level competency).
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Chapter 1 requires the Superintendent of Public Instruction, with the approval
of the State Board of Education, to develop a high school exit examination in
language arts and mathematics.1 9 To assist in the design and composition of the exit
examination, the Superintendent of Public Instruction must establish a High School
Exit Examination Standards Panel, consisting of teachers, administrators, school
board members, parents, and members of the general public.20 The content of the
examination must be aligned with academically rigorous content standards adopted
by the State Board of Education.21 The examination must have curricular validity;
that is, the examination must test the content found within the State's curriculum
framework.? The examination must also have instructional validity, meaning that
the examination must be consistent with what teachers teach in California
classrooms.23 In addition, the examination must comply with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act24 and its implementing regulations,25 which together provide that a
recipient of federal funds may not adopt policies which subject a person to
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.26 Furthermore, the
examination must comply with the requirements of the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974,27 which entitles all public school students to equal
educational opportunity without regard to race, sex, color, or national origin.2"
After the examination is created, it must be reviewed by the Statewide Pupil
Assessment and Review Panel before being adopted by the State Board of
Education.29 The State Board of Education must adopt the examination by October
1, 2000.30
Beginning with the 2000-2001 school year, and every year thereafter, school
districts must notify parents that, commencing in 2003-2004, each student must
19. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(a) (enacted by Chapter 1).
20. Id. § 60850(b) (enacted by Chapter 1); see also Ed Mendel, Davis Touts "Raising the Bar," SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 30, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 4060451 (indicating that the panel must be
representative of the State's diversity).
21. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(a) (enacted by Chapter 1); see also supra note 17 (providing the definition
of content standards).
22. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(e)(3), (0(2) (enacted by Chapter 1); see also infra Part IV.A.2.a.ii
(discussing curricular validity).
23. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(e)(3), (0(3) (enacted by Chapter 1). See generally Ellen Smith Pryor,
Student Competency Testing in Texas, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 903, 910-15 (1985) (explaining the concept of test
validity).
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1994 and Supp. 1999).
25. 34 C.FR. § 100.3(b)(2) (1998).
26. Id.
27. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1710,1712-1718,1720-1721 (West 2000).
28. Id. § 1701.
29. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(a) (enacted by Chapter 1); see also id. § 60606 (West Supp. 2000)
(describing the composition of the panel and the panel's task, which is to review any proposed state assessment
instrument for compliance with section 60614); id. § 60614 (Vest Supp. 1999) (prohibiting the administration
of any examination which solicits personal information).
30. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(a) (enacted by Chapter 1).
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pass the high school exit examination in order to graduate.31 The parental
notification must provide the date of the examination, the requirements for passing
the examination, and the consequences of failing the examination.32
Students may take the examination beginning in grade nine, but must take it in
grade ten.33 Students who do not pass the exit examination must be offered the
opportunity to attend summer school.34 They must also be provided with the
opportunity to receive supplementary instruction designed to assist them on the exit
examination.35 If a student fails a section of the examination, she may continue to
re-take that section until the end of the summer session immediately following her
original graduation date.36
Students with exceptional needs must be provided the opportunity to take the
examination in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
37
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.38 Schools must offer these students appropriate
accommodations in test-taking situations.39 Moreover, students who do not speak
English may refrain from taking the test for up to two years, but they can only
receive their diplomas upon passage of the test.40
After the examination has been adopted and initially administered, the State
Board of Education must study other methods by which students who are highly
proficient yet have difficulty passing the examination can otherwise demonstrate
competency and thereby receive their diplomas.4' Such methods may include high
school grades and alternative tests of a difficulty level equal to that of the high
school exit examination.42 If the State Board of Education determines that such
methods are appropriate, it shall make a recommendation to the Legislature that
those methods be adopted as an alternative to the statewide test.4 3
The overall results of the statewide administration of the examination will be
assessed by an independent evaluator.44 The evaluator will study beneficial and
31. Id. § 48980(e) (amended by Chapter 1).
32. Id
33. Id. § 60851(b) (enacted by Chapter 1).
34. Id. § 37252(a) (amended by Chapter 1).
35. Id. § 60851(e) (enacted by Chapter 1).
36. See id § 60851(b), (d) (enacted by Chapter 1); see also id. § 37252(b) (amended by Chapter 1)
(providing that summer school must be offered to students in grade 12 who have not passed the exit examination,
and that administration of the examination would follow such instruction).
37. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1420 (West 2000). This Act was formerly entitled the "Education for the
Handicapped Act"; section 25(b) of Public Law 102-119 amended the directory language of section 901(b) of
Public Law 101-476 by substituting "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act" for "Education for the
Handicapped Act." Pub. L. No. 102-119, § 25(b), 105 Stat. 607 (1991).
38. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1999).
39. CAL EDUC. CODE § 60850(g) (enacted by Chapter 1).
40. lod § 60852 (enacted by Chapter 1).
41. Id. § 60856 (enacted by Chapter 1).
42. ld
43. Id
44. Id. § 60855(a) (enacted by Chapter 1).
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detrimental effects of the examination on college enrollment, graduation rates, and
high school dropout rates.45 In the analysis of the data, the evaluator will
disaggregate scores by grade level, gender, race or ethnicity, and subject matter of
the examination.4 6 The evaluator must also provide separate reports for English
language learners, special education students, and low-income students.47
IV. ANALYSIS
Twenty-two states now require students to pass an examination before they can
graduate from high school.48 The legal challenges these states have faced in
implementing these examinations fit within three categories: constitutional
challenges,49 challenges based on discrimination, 50 and challenges based on the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.5' This Part will discuss those
challenges as applied to Chapter 1 and will assess the likely outcome should these
challenges be raised in court.
A. Constitutional Challenges
Constitutional challenges to high school exit examinations have included
alleged violations of the First Amendment52 and the Fourteenth Amendment 53 of the
United States Constitution."4 This sub-part will address these Constitutional
concerns.
45. Id. § 60855(a)(2) (enacied by Chapter 1).
46. Id. § 60855(a)(1)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 1).
47. Id. § 60855(b)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 1).
48. COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, supra note 3, at 7.
49. See infra Part IV.A (describing constitutional challenges to high school exit examinations).
50. See infra Part IV.B (discussing discrimination claims against high school exit examinations).
51. See infra Part IV.C (reviewing challenges to high school exit examinations based on the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. L
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
54. See infra Part .A.1 (considering challenges to high school exit examinations based on the First
Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); infra Part IV.A.2 (exploring challenges
to high school exit examinations based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause).
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1. Challenges Based on the First Amendment
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution bifurcates its concerns
with religion, as reflected by its Establishment Clause55 and its Free Exercise
clause. 6 Challenges to high school exit examinations based on the First
Amendment are similarly categorized as implicating one of these two clauses as
applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
57
a. Challenges Based on the Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has been interpreted to mean
that the government may not coerce anyone to participate in the exercise of religion
or establish a state religious faith. 8 To determine whether a statute violates the
Establishment Clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied a three-pronged
test: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the primary effect
of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the statute must not
foster an "excessive government entanglement" with religion.59 This analysis is
commonly called the Lemon test.60
In Triplett v. Livingston County Board of Education,61 the parents of a high
school senior attending a Livingston County, Kentucky, public school sought an
injunction to prevent the school board from refusing to graduate their son because
he had not taken the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS)
assessment examination.62 The local school board's policy made high school
graduation conditional upon taking the assessment test.63 The Tripletts claimed that
the requirement of taking the test violated the Establishment Clause of the United
Stated Constitution because some of the test questions conflicted with their
religious beliefs.64 Applying the Lemon test, the court held that the requirement of
taking the examination did not violate the Establishment Clause because: (1) the
purpose of the examination was to ensure school accountability, a secular
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from passing laws "respecting an establishment of
religion").
56. See id. amend. I (disallowing Congress from abrogating the citizens' rights to freely practice or abstain
from practicing a religion).
57. See id. amend. XIV, § 1 (denying states the right to violate a citizen's right to liberty without due
process); Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,690 (1994) (observing that the Establishment Clause is binding
on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boernev. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,519 (1997) (noting that
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
58. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,587 (1992).
59. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971).
60. See id. (explaining the provisions of the test).
61. 967 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1997).
62. Id. at 28.
63. Id
64. Il at 31.
365
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legislative purpose; (2) the examination, although it may have offended the
Tripletts' religious sensibilities, did not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) the
examination did not foster any government entanglement with religion, because
although some questions included pop culture and current events, these questions
could not be interpreted as promoting religious beliefs.65 Thus, this challenge to a
high school exit examination was not successful.
b. Challenges Based on the Free Exercise Clause
The Tripletts also brought a free exercise challenge against the school board.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prevents the government from
interfering with the exercise of one's religious beliefs.66 To determine whether the
Free Exercise Clause has been violated, the court examines whether or not the
governmental action is justified by a compelling state interest. 67
In Triplett, the parents contended that the requirement of taking the KIRIS
examination, which was necessary for high school graduation, violated the Free
Exercise Clause because requiring their son to take the test interfered with his right
to exercise his religion freely.6 The thrust of the Tripletts' claim was that the
content of the examination questions offended their religious beliefs because the
test established a religious or moral code, invaded their son's religious and moral
beliefs, discriminated on the basis of religion, and compelled their son to speak
against his beliefs by requiring him to select morally objectionable responses.69
The court held that even if the governmental action was contrary to the
Tripletts' religious practice, the State's interest in the improvement of the
educational system was sufficiently compelling to require all students to take the
exit examination. 70 The court stated, "We do not see how an assessment process can
measure performance in terms of educational equality and progress unless all
students are required to take the examination.",7' Thus, the Livingston County,
Kentucky, requirement of taking an exit examination survived challenges under
both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 72
65. Id.
66. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,591 (1992).
67. Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963).
68. Triplet, 967 S.W.2d at 31.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id.
72. Supra notes 65, 70 and accompanying text.
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c. Chapter 1 and the First Amendment Questions
Given that there are 256 separate and substantial religious groups in this
country,73 it is likely that the California high school exit examination will offend
someone's religious sensibilities, or that questions on the examination will conflict
with some student's religious beliefs.74 For example, a science question may raise
concerns about evolution. An English literature question may refer to an author
whose works some sects consider profane. A history question may omit a reference
to the religious underpinnings of a historical event. However, California has taken
two measures in an attempt to ensure that no inadvertent, substantial violations of
religious beliefs occur in the application of the high school exit examination
proposed under Chapter 1.75
First, Chapter 1 requires the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to
establish a High School Exit Examination Standards Panel to assist in the design
and composition of the exit examination.76 The panel must be representative of the
State's ethnic, gender, and geographical and cultural diversity, and include teachers,
administrators, school board members, parents, and the general public.7 7 This
representative panel will check for test bias toward religious or ethnic groups.78
In addition, California Education Code section 60606, an existing provision,
mandates that, after adopting an academic achievement test, the State Board of
Education must submit the testing instrument to the Statewide Pupil Assessment
Review Panel.79 This panel is composed of six members, the majority of whom are
parents of children attending the State's public schools.80 The panel's task is to
review the adopted testing instrument to ensure that it does not contain any items
that solicit disclosure of a student's personal beliefs or practices in sex, family life,
morality, or religion, or that evaluate personal behavioral characteristics such as
honesty, integrity, or self-esteem.8 '
Given the safeguards California has set in place to ensure that religious bias is
not included in any adopted test, and given the persuasive ruling in Triplett,8 2 any
73. See People ex rel McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,235 (1948) (indicating that there are 256
different religious groups in the United States).
74. See id. (arguing that if educators omit everything that is objectionable to any sect, or inconsistent with
any sect's doctrines, public education will be left "in shreds").
75. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (explaining the measures taken to ensure that the high
school exit examination does not violate religious beliefs).
76. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(b) (enacted by Chapter 1).
77. i
78. Mendel, supra note 20, at Al.
79. CAL EDUC. CODE § 60606 (West Supp. 2000).
80. AL
81. Id.; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60614 (West Supp. 2000) (detailing the personal beliefs or practices
that cannot be covered on an examination).
82. See supra Part IV.A.l.a.-b (discussing the results of First Amendment challenges to the requirement
of taking an examination).
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challenge to the high school exit examination based on the Establishment or the
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment will not likely succeed.
2. Challenges Based on the Fourteenth Amendment
Challenges to high school exit examinations based on the Fourteenth
Amendment have been founded in two clauses of that Amendment: the Due Process
Clause,83 and the Equal Protection Clause.8
a. Challenges Based on the Due Process Clause
Challenges to high school exit examinations under the Due Process Clause have
taken two forms: (1) challenges based on procedural due process, 85 and (2)
challenges based on substantive due process.86
i. Challenges Based on Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process provides individuals the right to have notice and the
opportunity to be heard before being deprived by the state of life, liberty, or
property.87 To determine whether procedural due process requirements apply, courts
look to the nature of the interest at stake.88 Governmental damage to reputation
alone, for example, is not a sufficient interest to invoke the procedural protections
of the Due Process Clause.89 However, if the state officials stigmatize a person, and
that action then damages a more tangible interest, such as employment, this damage
to the tangible interest constitutes damage to a protected liberty interest that cannot
be deprived without the exhaustion of procedural protections. 9° In addition,
government deprivation of a benefit to which a person has a legitimate claim of
entitlement implicates a property interest, and thus also requires procedural due
process.9
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property[ ] without due process of law").
84. See id. (stating that no state shall "deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws).
85. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.i (discussing challenges to high school exit examinations based on procedural
due process claims).
86. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.ii (discussing challenges to high school exit examinations based on substantive
due process claims).
87. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569-70 (1972).
88. Id. at 570; see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,224 (1976) (holding that not every grievous loss
inflicted by the government on an individual is sufficient to invoke due process rights).
89. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,701 (1976).
90. Id.
91. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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Challenges to high school exit examinations have been based on procedural due
process violations due to governmental imposition of a stigma that forecloses one's
freedom to take advantage of employment opportunities. For example, in Board of
Education v. Ambach,9 2 the parents of two handicapped students brought an action
to enjoin an order invalidating diplomas the students had received.93 The students
did not pass the basic competency test required by the Board of Regents to obtain
diplomas.' The court noted that judicial deference to the broad discretion vested
in public school officials was appropriate, and that courts will rarely review an
educational institution's evaluation of the academic performance of its students.
95
The court indicated, however, that when constitutional rights are alleged to have
been violated, educational policy decisions are not beyond judicial review.96 The
court held that the retraction of a high school diploma was a deprivation of a
protected liberty interest.97 Because such deprivation stigmatized the petitioners and
would impose an obstacle which would foreclose their freedom in pursuing
employment opportunities, they were deprived of a protected liberty interest."
The government's deprivation of a benefit to which a person has a legitimate
claim of entitlement also implicates a property interest, and thus also requires
procedural due process. 99 In Debra P v. Turlington,'° the court held that by
establishing a system of free public education and by making school attendance
mandatory, the State had created for the students a legitimate expectation that, if
they attended school and took and passed the required courses, they would receive
their high school diplomas.' Thus, the high school diploma, the court held, is a
constitutionally protected property interest,'°2 and thus procedural due process-the
right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard-applies.
92. 436 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1981).
93. Id. at 566.
94. Id. at 566-67.
95. Id at 569-72; see also Erik V. v. Causby, 977 F. Supp. 384, 390 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (finding a strong
democratic interest in American society in deferring to the policy decisions made by duly elected public officials);
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1978) (stating that decisions by educational authorities which
evaluate academic performance of students, as they relate to promotion, are inappropriate for review in ajudicial
context).
96. Ambach, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
97. Id. at 572.
98. Id; see also Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179, 185 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the right to receive a diploma, if prior graduation requirements were met, constituted a liberty interest sufficient
to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause). But see Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472,
504 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that no liberty interest was involved in a student's failure to attain a diploma if such
failure was not publicized).
99. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972).
100. 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
101. Id. at 403-04.
102. Id at 404. But see Bester v. Tuscaloosa City Bd. of Educ., 722 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the plaintiffs had no property rights in the expectation that substandard scholastic achievement would
continue to be accepted as a basis for promotion to the next grade level).
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However, the question remains as to what process is due.'0 3 The issue of what
constitutes adequate notice of a requirement of passing a high school exit
examination before receiving a diploma centers around the timing between the date
on which students are first given notice that passing the test is a prerequisite to
obtaining a diploma, and the date on which the requirement actually goes into
effect.C4 Such notice is necessary to ensure that students have an adequate
opportunity to prepare for the test. 05
In Anderson v. Banks,1°6 the plaintiffs challenged the use of a high school exit
examination on the grounds that it violated procedural due process.0 7 In that case,
the court held that, where the school had ensured that the test could be re-taken and
that remedial courses would be provided, the notice period of more than two years
was adequate.108 In contrast, in Debra P. v. Turlington,'c9 the statute requiring that
students pass a high school exit examination was promulgated in 1978, and applied
to the high school graduation class of 1979.10 The court found the notice to be
inadequate, because the students were told about the test "at the eleventh hour and
with virtually no warning..'' Similarly, in Board of Education v. Ambach,"2 the
court held that the period of notice, which was less than two school years, was not
an adequate time period for students to prepare to take the examination.'
3
103. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (indicating that determining when due process is
required is easier than determining what constitutes adequate notice and opportunity to be heard).
104. See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to high school exit e:aminations
based on the amount of advance notice students had received regarding the fact that they would be required to take
the test before they could be graduated).
105. Crump v. Gilmer Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 F. Supp. 552, 555 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
106. 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
107. Id. at 505.
108. I
109. 644 F2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 404.
111. Id; see also Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179, 187 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
eighteen months' notice was not sufficient time for special education students to prepare for the examination);
Crump v. Gilmer Indep. Sch. Dist. 797 F. Supp. 552,553 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (granting a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the school district from barring three students from graduation ceremonies because they had not passed
the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills examination. The court indicated that the plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on the merits of the case, because, inter alia, the examination was made substantially more difficult in
the fall of 1991, and the students were expected to pass the examination by May of 1992.). But see
Mahavongsanon v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that nine months' notice of a new degree
requirement in the form of a comprehensive examination was timely notice, because the plaintiff could take the
test a second time or take other courses in lieu of taking the test); Williams v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 796 F.
Supp. 251, 253-54 (.D. Tex. 1992) (upholding the graduation requirement of passing the Texas Assessment of
Academic Skills, because the student had known for seven years that he must pass a high school exit examination,
although the particular exam, which was much more difficult than previous exams, had only been adopted the
previous year).
112. 436 N.Y.S. 564 (1981).
113. Id. at 575.
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ii. Challenges Based on Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process requires that the government avoid action which is
arbitrary and capricious, does not achieve a legitimate state interest, or is
fundamentally unfair. 1 4 A substantive due process analysis involves two steps."'
First, the challenged state action must implicate a fundamental right.116 The right
must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition '"1 7 and "necessary to
an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."1 8 The United States Supreme Court
has held that these fundamental rights include, for example, the right to marry," 9
the right of personal privacy,120 and the right to trial by jury.'2'
Second, the government is required to show that its action, if it infringes upon
a fundamental right, is justified by a compelling state interest and that the exit exam
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.'2 In the words of Justice Souter,
"[W]hen the legislation's justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from being
commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly
applied[,] ... the statute must give way."''
Challenges to high school exit examinations have successfully been made on
the basis of violation of substantive due process because the high school exit
examination in question lacked curricular validity.'2 4 Thus, the requirement was
fundamentally unfair, because the examination was not related to what students had
been taught.'2
Curricular validity has two components. First, the test items must adequately
correspond to the required curriculum in which the students should have been
instructed by the time they take the test.' 26 Second, the test must correspond to the
114. Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397,404 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981); see also Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91 (1978) (stating that substantive due process is not violated if the government action
is not arbitrary or capricious); Mahavongsanan, 529 F.2d at 449 (holding that academic dismissals can be enjoined
if shown to be clearly arbitrary or capricious).
115. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1997).
116. Id.
117. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
118. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
119. Zablocki v. Rehail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
121. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
122. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
123. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 (Souter, ., concurring).
124. See Pryor, supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing test validity and the concept of curricular
validity).
125. See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 404-05 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) (holding that the
high school exit examination was fundamentally unfair in that it may have covered matters not taught in the
schools of the state); Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472, 498 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (stating that a past dual
educational system that had operated separate schools for whites and blacks may have prevented some students
from learning what they needed to know to pass the test, and thus the test lacked curricular validity for them).
126. Pryor, supra note 23, at 915 (citing M.S. McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and
Educational Issues, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 651, 682-83 (1979)).
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material that was actually taught in the schools, regardless of what should have
been taught."27 Thus, substantive due process challenges to high school exit
examinations have been rooted in allegations that the examinations covered
material which was not taught, an action which would be fundamentally unfair and
unrelated to any legitimate educational goal."
In Debra R v. Turlington,129 the high school exit examination was developed
to match the minimum performance standards of the Florida Department of
Education.130 However, no effort was made by the Florida Department of Education
to ascertain whether or not the test items were actually taught in Florida public
schools. 3' The court held that fundamental fairness required that the State prove
students were tested only on material that they had been taught. 32 The court
remanded the matter, requiring the State to prove on remand that the material had
been covered in class. 33 On remand, the trial court held that the tested material
indeed had been a part of the curriculum, and thus the graduation requirement
would be upheld.34
In Anderson v. Banks,135 the court held that the goal of the exit examination
policy-to motivate students to strive for greater academic achievement-was a
legitimate educational goal. 36 The court further held that basing the examination
on a ninth grade achievement level was not unreasonable.33 However, although the
material tested on the high school exit examination should have been included in
any standard high school curriculum, the questions posed in the examination at
issue could not be traced to the specific curriculum employed in the county's
schools. Therefore, the Debra P. standard had not been met, and the exit test
therefore violated substantive due process. 38 The court stated, "Because it has not
been demonstrated that the items on the [test] were actually taught in the...
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Anderson v. Banks, 520 F Supp. 472,509 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that because the school
district could not prove that the tested material was taught, the school district had not proven the test was fair, and
thus the exit examination could not be made a requirement for graduation).
129. 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
130. Id. at 400 n.1,401.
131. Id. at 405.
132. M. at 406.
133. Id.; see also Crump v. Gilmer Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 F. Supp. 522, 556 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that
because the schcol district did not prove that the material tested was actually taught in its schools, the plaintiffs
should be p-.rmitted to attend graduation ceremonies).
134. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1416-17 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that if the material had
been taught, the graduation requirement would not have been a violation of substantive due process, unless
vestiges of a dual school system-a system for white children and a system for black children-had inhibited the
students' ability to learn what had been taught).
135. 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
136. M. at 506.
137. 1a& at 507.
138. Id. at 509.
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schools, the use of the [test] as an exit exam must fall on substantial due process
grounds. 139
On the other hand, in Williams v. Austin Independent School District,'4° the
court held that the school district had presented substantial evidence that the school
had provided, and the student had taken, courses that adequately prepared him to
take and pass the high school exit examination, and the district had not violated the
student's right of substantive due process.
41
b. Challenges Based on the Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution includes the
Equal Protection Clause, which states that no state shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 42 The Equal Protection Clause is
a general protection against arbitrary classifications that discriminate against a
particular group.' 43 All laws that classify citizens must bear at least some rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest'44 As it applies to students, equal
protection means that a state must treat all similarly situated students similarly.145
Equal protection challenges to high school exit examinations have arisen
because of plaintiffs' contentions that they are being treated differently from other
students, and thus state officials have violated the Equal Protection Clause with
respect to them. For example, in Rankins v. Louisiana State Board of Education,'46
the plaintiffs argued that, because students attending state-approved non-public
schools, students in home-study programs, and persons obtaining a General
Educational Development diploma (GED) were not required to take the high school
exit examination prior to receiving a state diploma, the requirement for the
examination violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 47
The court developed a two-step analysis in its response. First, it reasoned that
the examination, as per Debra P. v. Turlington, 48 could only be administered if it
139. Id. at 509.
140. 796 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
141. Id. at 254.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
144. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,463 (1988) (holding that a rational basis must
exist for some school districts, but not others, to be permitted to charge a fee for school bus transportation).
145. See, e.g., David v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that refusal
to administer hyperactivity drugs above the recommended dosage was not a denial of equal protection, because
all other students in similar situations were treated the same, and the action was rationally related to the district's
interest in protecting student health); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 488 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
charter school designed for at-risk students did not deny equal protection because non-at-risk students must also
be admitted, and the state had a legitimate interest in encouraging educational innovation).
146. 637 So. 2d 548 (La. 1994).
147. Id. at 552.
148. 644 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981); see supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text
(describing the Debra P. inquiry).
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were specifically tied to the curriculum taught in the schools. 149 Second, because the
Louisiana Constitution prohibited the State Board of Education from dictating the
contents of the curriculum in non-public schools and home-study programs, and
because the curriculum of the GED program differed from that of a regular high
school program, the state could not require non-public school students to pass the
high school exit examination before receiving a state diploma.50 The plaintiffs may
have been treated differently from other students, but not from all similarly situated
students, and thus the State had not violated the Equal Protection Clause.' The
State of Louisiana had a valid interest in ensuring the minimum competency of
persons obtaining a state diploma, and the test bore a rational relationship to this
goal. t52
c. Chapter l's Chances upon Facing Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Procedural due process challenges to high school exit examinations in other
jurisdictions have established that the deprivation of a high school diploma is the
deprivation of both a liberty and property interest, and thus a student is entitled to
adequate notice before being deprived of a diploma.15 3 The original wording of the
bill that became Chapter 1 would have required the graduating class of 2003 to take
the exit examination before receiving a high school diploma.'t 54 This notice period
would then have been three years. However, later amendments changed the timing
of the requirement so that the graduating class of 2004 will be the first class
required to pass the high school exit examination. 55 Thus, the notice period is four
years. If a California court adopts the persuasive ruling in Anderson v.
Bankst'--which had approved a notice period of two years where the school had
also provided that the test could be retaken and the students could take remedial
courses-then the notice period of four years, complete with provisions that the test
may be retaken several times, as well as guarantees of the availability of remedial
courses, will probably ensure that Chapter 1 will not be successfully challenged on
procedural due process grounds.
149. Rankins, 637 So. 2d at 554.
150. It at 554-55; see also Debra P., 644 F.2d at 406 (holding that a high school exit examination does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because it was given only in public, and not private, schools);
Wells v. Banks, 266 S.E.2d 270,272-73 (Ga. 1980) (holding that equal protection was not denied to students from
one Georgia county who were required to pass a high school exit examination, while students in other counties
were not).
151. Rankins, 637 So. 2d at 554-55.
152. Id. at 555.
153. See supra Part IV.A.2.a.i (discussing challenges to the high school exit examination based on
inadequate notice).
154. SB 2 (1999) (as introduced on February 10, 1999).
155. CAL EDUC. CODE § 48980(e) (enacted by Chapter 1).
156. 520 F. Supp. 472,505 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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Chapter 1 is more vulnerable to challenges on the grounds of substantive due
process due to lack of curricular validity. Chapter 1 states that the test must be
aligned with the rigorous state-adopted content standards. 157 However, there is no
assurance that these standards are presently being taught in California's schools.15
There is also no legal requirement that they be taught; state law actually prohibits
the State Department of Education from prescribing what will be taught in the
schools of the State.1
5 9
Even if school districts across the State wish to adopt and teach the new
standards, it may take them some time to implement them.16 For example, the
content standards in mathematics include the following courses: Algebra I, Algebra
II, Geometry, and Probability and Statistics.161 Of 2.1 million students in junior high
and high school mathematics classes in 1997, only 223,000 took Pre-algebra, only
346,000 took Algebra I, and only 173,000 took Plane Geometry.162 Obviously,
before students can pass an examination on these subjects, they need to take the
appropriate courses from competent mathematics teachers. 63 Teacher support and
teacher training to implement the new standards are necessary before the standards
can be taught.' 64 If the standards are not taught, the high school exit examination
will lack curricular validity and be vulnerable to challenges based on the
substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if a California
court adopts the reasoning of Debra P. and Anderson.165
157. CAL EDUC. CODE § 60850(a) (enacted by Chapter 1).
158. See, e.g., Julian Guthrie, Only Half Might Pass School Test, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 10, 1999, at Al,
available in 1999 WL 6868115 (quoting State Superintendent of Schools Delaine Eastin as saying that, statewide,
California's high school curriculum lacks "the consistency we require" to implement the test); Terri Hardy, Rush
For Reform, L.A. DALY NEws, Feb. 21, 1999, at V1, available in 1999 WL 7015825 (indicating that the more
difficult curriculum has not been implemented in most schools in the State); Jennifer Kerr, High School Exit
Exam's Marks Mixed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 8, 1999, at A3, available in 1999 WL 4046323 (noting that
the new standards are "just starting to filter down" to the State's 1,000 public school districts); Some Missing
Pieces in Education Package, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 1999, at A22, available in 1999 WL 2678449 (stating that
Governor Davis is "jumping the gun" with the exit examination requirement, and that the first step should be to
ensure that students have access to the "rigorous curriculum that should be reflected on the test").
159. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33308.5 (West 1993) (stating that program guidelines issued by the State
Department of Education shall serve only as models or examples).
160. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty of implementing the new
standards).
161. MATHEMATICS STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 36.
162. Some Missing Pieces in Education Package, supra note 158, at A22.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 158, at V1 (stating that many believe that ill-trained teachers are not up
to the task of instructing more advanced courses); Kerr, supra note 158, at A3 (quoting Assemblymember
Mazzoni, Chair of the Education Committee, as stating that curriculum and teacher support are necessary before
implementation of the test, and Delaine Eastin, State Superintendent of Schools, as stating that the examination
should take effect in 2007 in order to give schools more time to "toughen their teaching"); Some Missing Pieces
in Education Package, supra note 158, at A22 (indicating that competent general education teachers are difficult
to find, and mathematics teachers are "an endangered species").
165. See supra notes 129-32, 135-39 and accompanying text (explaining the courts' analyses in Debra P.
and Anderson).
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Challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, on the other hand, will most likely fail. If a California court follows
the ruling in Rankins,'66 which held that the requirement of the high school exit
examination did not have to apply to all students in the State, then the Chapter 1
system will be upheld, because although the test is only required in public schools,
the State has no authority to require testing for non-public school students.
B. Challenges Based on Discrimination Claims
Challenges to high school exit examinations based on discrimination claims
have been founded on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 197367 and of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.68
1. Challenges Based on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,'69 often called by its former
moniker, "Section 504" (§ 504),170 provides that "no otherwise qualified
handicapped individual... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, orbe subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.,' 7' To
establish that one is an "otherwise qualified individual with a disability" under
§ 504, one must first show that one has an impairment which substantially limits a
major life activity.' 72 Once this is established, "otherwise qualified" is defined as
one who is able, in spite of one's handicap, to meet all the requirements of a
program operated by an entity which receives federal funding.' 73
166. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (noting that the court in Rankins held that a high school
exit examination does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because not every student is required to take
it).
167. See infra Part IV.B.I (discussing challenges to high school exit examinations based on the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
168. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing challenges to high school exit examinations based on Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
169. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1999 & Supp. 1999).
170. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibited entities receiving federal financial assistance
from discriminating based upon the known physical or mental impairments of an otherwis, qualified individual.
That section is now codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794, but is still commonly called § 504. Future references will be
to § 504.
171. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1999).
172. Id.; 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 1999); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1998); see also
School BL of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1987) (holding that to qualify as a "disability"
under § 504, a disability must substantially limit a major life activity).
173. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (holding that "otherwise
qualified" means qualified in spite of one's handicap, not qualified except for one's handicap). Otherwise, a blind
person possessing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be "otherwise qualified" for the job
of driving. Id.
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In Ellis v. Morehouse School ofMedicine, 74 the plaintiff suffered from dyslexia
and sought a court order to reinstate him after he was dismissed from medical
school for failing grades. 75 The court held that dyslexia substantially limits the
major life activity of learning because it hinders the ability to read. 176 However, the
plaintiff did not meet the requirement that he could perform the essential functions
necessary as a medical student despite his disability or with reasonable
accommodation for his disability, and thus did not meet the definition of "otherwise
qualified."' 77 Therefore, he was subject to dismissal from the school for failing
grades.17
8
The definition of "otherwise qualified" was also at issue in Brookhart v. Illinois
State Board of Education.179 In Brookhart, the plaintiffs argued that the high school
exit examination was discriminatory because students with learning disabilities
were unable to pass the test. The plaintiffs contended that the students were
otherwise qualified to receive a diploma."* However, the court held that a student
who is unable to learn is "surely not" an individual who is qualified in spite of her
handicap.18' Thus, denial of a diploma because a student could not pass the exit
examination was not discriminatory under § 504.182
In Anderson v. Banks,8 3 the plaintiffs argued that because school authorities
chose to define a diploma as a reflection of a certain level of academic
achievement, they had discriminated against handicapped students by denying them
the benefits of a diploma. m The court held that while school authorities were free
to award a diploma to any student, § 504 did not require that they do so, nor did it
require them to lower or modify academic standards for the receipt of a diploma.
A similar result was reached in Board of Education v. Ambach. 86 There, the
court held that the denial of a diploma based on the inability to pass a high school
exit examination is not a denial of a benefit "solely by reason of" a handicap.' 87
174. 925 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
175. Id. at 1543.
176. 1l
177. Il
178. lId
179. 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983).
180. Id. at 184.
181. Id.; see also Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737,741-42 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a law
student suffering from alcoholism was not "otherwise qualified" when he was unable to meet the law school's
academic standards).
182. Bmokhart, 697 F.2d at 184.
183. 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
184. Id. at 509.
185. Id. at 511.
186. 436 N.Y.S.2d 564,569(1981).
187. Id.; see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979) (holding that
§ 504 does not require "an educational institution to lower or effect substantial modifications of standards to
accommodate a handicapped person").
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The enabling regulation for § 504 requires modification of the testing situation
to minimize the effects of the plaintiff's handicap. 8 In course examinations or
other procedures for evaluation of students' academic achievement, the school
district must ensure that the results reflect the achievement in the course.'89 Thus,
academic adjustments such as additional time-and auxiliary aids such as
interpreters for the hearing impaired, classroom equipment designed for those with
manual impairments, braille lettering, or large print-may be required. t19
A challenge to high school exit examinations under this § 504 regulation was
brought to the U.S. Office of Civil Rights by the parent of a learning-disabled
student.'91 The Office of Civil Rights has the responsibility and authority to
investigate complaints regarding § 504. 192 The parent alleged that the school district
had discriminated against her son because it had refused to provide him with a
reader to assist him in taking the high school exit examination. 9 3 The Office of
Civil Rights held that even though a test is intended specifically to measure reading
competency, requiring high school students to complete the test without a reader's
assistance is not discriminatory. 94 The Office reasoned that if the purpose of the
test is to assess a student's reading competency, a legitimate state objective,
assistance in the form of a reader would not allow for such assessment. 9 5
2. Challenges Based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' t96 The Title VI regulations
provide that a recipient of federal funds may not adopt policies which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination: in other words, which have a
disparate impact on a protected group. 97 If a disparate impact results from a school
district's policy, the defendant has the burden of justifying the policy as an
188. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (1998).
189. a.
190. Brookhart v. Illinois State Ed. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179, 184 (7th Cir. 1983).
191. Hawaii State Dept. of Educ., 17 EDuc. FOR Ti-E HANDICAPPED L. REP. 360, 360 (1990).
192. Id.
193. Md.
194. IL
195. Il
196. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
197. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1998); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1998) (stating that disparate impact
is generally found if the success rate of a protected group is less than 80% of the rate of the most highly successful
group).
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"educational necessity."' 98 Some courts have defined "educational necessity" to
mean a "substantial legitimate justification" for the challenged policy or practice. 199
Others require proof of a "manifest relationship" between the policy and the
defendant's educational objectives.2"
In Anderson v. Banks,20' plaintiffs claimed that the Georgia high school exit
examination violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the
examination had both a disproportionate racial impact and a discriminatory
purpose." 2 Because many more African-American students failed the test than
white students, the test clearly had a disproportionate racial impact.20 3 However, the
court held that a discriminatory purpose could only be proven if: (1) the
discriminatory impact was clearly foreseeable; and (2) no justifying factors
supported the policy behind the high school exit examination. 204 The court
determined that the school district had not violated Title VI, because although the
disproportionate effect on African-American children was foreseeable, no evidence
existed as to a discriminatory intent to deny access to a diploma to African-
American children, and the improvement of the performance of the district's
students was a legitimate and an important goal.20 5 The court did, however, delay
the implementation of the test due to past negative effects of a dual educational
system which would impede African-American children's ability to pass the test.206
In 1995, the federal Office of Civil Rights (OCR) received a complaint from the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) against the
198. See Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979) (holding that proof of educational necessity
can rebut the disparate impact test). The burden of proof is on the party claimed to have caused the disparate
impact. Id.; see also Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the defendant must
demonstrate that the requirement which caused the disproportionate impact was required by educational
necessity); Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397,407 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) (same).
199. See, e.g., Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (holding that
according to the Title VI standard, the defendants only needed to show that "a substantial legitimate justification"
existed for the challenged practice); Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 937 F. Supp. 1397,
1400 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same).
200. See, e.g., Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dept., 709 F. Supp. 345, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that
a manifest relationship must exist between the educational policy and the goal to be achieved); Georgia State
Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F2d 1403, 1418 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982
n.9 (same).
201. 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
202. Id. at 498.
203. Id.
204. d
205. Id
206. Id at 500; see also Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F2d 397, 407 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) (holding that
many students in segregated schools received an education inferior to that received by white students during the
same period, and that immediate use of the diploma sanction would be unfair, as it would punish black students
for deficiencies created by the dual school system).
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Texas Education Agency (TEA).2 The complaint alleged that the Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) violated Title VI due to its alleged
discriminatory impact on African-American and Hispanic students.20 8 After two
years, a resolution agreement was reached whereby the TEA agreed to ensure that
each school district in the state provided the curriculum and instruction necessary
to afford all students an effective opportunity to acquire the knowledge and skills
needed to pass the tests.20 TEA also agreed to provide students with alternative
means of demonstrating proficiency, through end-of-course examinations.210
Finally, TEA agreed to use broadly representative test review committees to ensure
the tests were fair to all students regardless of their race, color, or national origin.21,
3. Chapter I's Chances Against Possible Discrimination Claims
Students with learning disabilities may not be able to pass the California high
school exit examination. However, if California courts adopt the rulings in
Brookhart,2 2 Anderson,21 3 and Ambach,2 4 the courts are not likely to find that
California's denial of a diploma to a student who cannot pass the high school exit
examination is a denial of a benefit to an otherwise qualified individual solely on
the basis of a handicap.1 5 In addition, Chapter 1 includes language explicitly
mandating that the high school exit examination be offered to individuals with
exceptional needs in accordance with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and
that these individuals be administered the examination with appropriate
accommodations where necessary.216 Moreover, Chapter 1 provides that the State
Board of Education must study other criteria by which "otherwise qualified" high
school stfidents may demonstrate their proficiency, such as by establishing an
207. Letter from Taylor D. August, Director, Dallas Office of Southern Division of Office for Civil Rights,
to Dr. Mike Moses, Texas Commissioner of Education (June 16, 1997) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
208. Id
209. See TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, TAAS RESOLUTION COMMrrMENT 2,4,6 (1997) (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (providing assurances that the TEA will ensure that the knowledge and skills needed
to pass the TAAS are infused in students; this assurance is repeated three times within the document).
210. Id. at 5.
211. Id. at 11.
212. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text (stating theruling inBrookhart that denial ofa diploma
to a student who is unable to learn is not discriminatory).
213. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing the ruling in Anderson that school officials do
not have to lower standards so that students will pass an examination, and that the performance of students is a
legitimate governmental goal even though the exit examination may have a disparate impact).
214. See supra note 187 (noting the Ambach holding that denial of a diploma based on the inability to pass
an exit exam is not a denial of a benefit solely on the basis of a handicap).
215. See supra Part IV.B.1 (describing challenges to high school exit examinations based on discrimination
against individuals with disabilities).
216. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(g) (enacted by Chapter 1).
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exemplary academic record or by taking an alternative test.217 Appropriate
accommodations for those students with special needs, and provision for alternative
means to show competency, will likely yield few, if any, successful challenges to
California's high school exit examination based on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, because the requirements of that Act will have been met.21 8
California's high school exit examination also appears to comply with the
requirements of Title VI. 2 19 In virtually every state that has implemented high
school exit examinations, a disproportionate number of those who fail the test are
students of color.220 Thus, it is foreseeable, based on experiences with high school
exit examinations in other states, that the California test may have a
disproportionate impact on minority students. 22' However, California will be able
to show a legitimate objective for the test; the bill itself states that the intent of the
Legislature is to improve significantly student achievement and ensure that students
who graduate from high school can demonstrate grade level competency in reading,
writing, and mathematics. 222 Further, Chapter 1 provides for a study of alternative
means of demonstrating proficiency, m and for broadly representative test review
committees designed to ensure against racial or ethnic bias in the test.224 These
provisions, similar to those of the Resolution Commitment submitted to the OCR
by the Texas Educational Agency, should thwart a challenge to Chapter 1 based on
Title VI.
However, ensuring that test content is taught to all students will be impossible
for the State Department of Education, given its statutory inability to mandate
curriculum content.tm Thus, if minority students in any school are not provided
appropriate instruction, Chapter 1 may be vulnerable to a Title VI discrimination
217. Id. § 60856 (enacted by Chapter 1).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73 (stating the requirements of § 504).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97 (explaining the requirements of Title VI).
220. APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, NO EXIT: TESTING, TRACKING AND STUDENTS OP COLOR IN U.S. PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (1999) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Millicent Lawton, Discrimination
Claimed in Texas Exit Exam Lawsuit, ED. WEEK, Oct. 22, 1997 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(noting that the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) was seeking an injunction
against the TAAS test, due to its disproportionate impact on Mexican American students); Michelle Melendez,
Mexican-American Group Challenges TAAS Test Requirementfor Graduation, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July
12, 1998, at 24, available in 1998 WL 3305859 (same); Drew Lindsay, No Racial Bias Found in Ohio's School
Exit Test, ED. WEEK, Oct. 12, 1994 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing that the Office of
Civil Rights found that Ohio's high school exit examination was not discriminatory despite the disparate impact,
as long as all students were exposed to the curriculum).
221. APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 220.
222. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1, sec. 1, at 30-31.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43 (describing the State Board of Education's study of
alternative methods of demonstrating proficiency).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 29 (pointing out that two different panels will review the
examination).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59 (explaining that the California State Department may
recommend, but not mandate, curricula in the public schools).
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challenge based on failure to provide adequate opportunities for minority students
to learn the curriculum which is tested in the exit examination.226
C. Challenges Based on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,227 commonly known as the
IDEA, guarantees a "free appropriate education" to all children. 228 The term "free
appropriate public education" means special education and related services
provided without charge and in conformity with the student's individualized
educational plan.229 This sub-part will explore the IDEA as it relates to high school
exit examinations.
1. Precedents Regarding the IDEA and Exit Examination Requirements
Challenges to high school exit examinations brought under the IDEA have
centered around the alleged denial of a free, appropriate public education. For
example, in Board of Education v. Ambach,230 two special education students
brought an action to prevent the invalidation of their high school diplomas because
they did not pass the high school exit examination."3 They alleged, inter alia, that
the denial of the diplomas would be a violation of the IDEA in that it would deny
them the "free appropriate education" guaranteed by that Act. The court held that
the IDEA does not require specific results, that the award of a diploma was not a
necessary part of a "free appropriate education," and therefore that denial of a
diploma due to failure to pass the exit examination was not a violation of the
IDEA.2
33
226. See Letter from Elena Soto-Chapa, Statewide Education Director of the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), to California Education Secretary Gary Hart and Senator Jack
O'Connell (March 3, 1999) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (requesting that Chapter I include a
provision that the Superintendent of Public Instruction conduct curriculum audits at each junior high and high
school to ensure that textbooks and curriculum correlate with the content of the high school exit examination, and
take steps to ensure that such alignment will be accomplished at schools that the audits reveal have not bcen
providing appropriate textbooks and curriculum. Such an amendment would have provided assurances that
minority students were taught the content of the high school exit examination.).
227. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1420 (West 2000). This Act formerly was entitled the "Education for the
Handicapped Act"; Section 25(b) of Public Law 102-119 amended the directory language of section 901(b) of
Public Law 101-476 by substituting "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act" for "Education for the
Handicapped Act." Pub. L. No. 102-119, § 25(b), 105 Stat. 607 (1991).
228. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (West 2000).
229. Id. § 1401(a)(18).
230. 436 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1981).
231. Id. at 566.
232. Id. at 570.
233. Id.; see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 (1982) (stating that the intent of the Act was
more to open the door of public education to handicapped children than to guarantee any particular level of
education); Battle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the
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A similar result was reached in Brookhart v. Illinois State Board of
Education.234 In that case, fourteen handicapped students challenged the
requirement that a high school exit examination be passed before a diploma would
be awarded. 25 The court stated that "[d]enial of diplomas to handicapped children
who have been receiving the special education and related services required by the
Act, but are unable to achieve the educational level necessary to pass the Minimal
Competency Test, is not a denial of a 'free appropriate public education.'
' 2 6
However, the court did state that because the material on the test did not appear on
the students' individualized education programs, the programs were not developed
to meet the goal of passing the test.23 7 Thus, these students were entitled to an
extended period of preparation before being required to take the test.23
2. Likely Outcomes for Possible IDEA Challenges to Chapter 1
Chapter 1 mandates that California's high school exit examination be offered
to individuals with exceptional needs in accordance with the IDEA."9 Students with
exceptional needs will be provided with appropriate accommodations.240 Thus, any
challenges that may arise in the area of appropriate accommodations for students
with disabilities will not likely be successful. Furthermore, based on the ruling in
Ambach,24' a challenge to the high school exit examination which simply claims
that the award of a high school diploma is part of a "free appropriate education"
would not be likely to succeed.
However, based on the persuasive holding in Brookhart,242 school district
personnel would be wise to include material on the test in the students'
individualized education programs, if appropriate for the individual student.
Furthermore, a California court, as in Brookhart, may require an extended period
of preparation for these students.243 The first group of students with disabilities to
be required to pass the examination will have had four years to prepare for it.244
Education of the Handicapped Act does not require specific results); Mrs. A.J. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 478
F. Supp. 418,431 (D. Minn. 1979) (same); Kelly K. v. Town of Framingham, 633 N.E.2d 414, 415 (Mass. 1994)
(same).
234. 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983).
235. Id. at 181.
236. Id. at 183.
237. Id at 187.
238. Id.
239. CAL EDUC. CODE § 60850(g) (enacted by Chapter 1).
240. d
241. Board ofEduc. v. Ambach, 436 N.Y.S.2d 564,570 (1981).
242. Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1983).
243. Id. at 186-88.
244. See supra text accompanying note 31 (indicating that parents must be notified that the high school exit
examination requirement will take effect beginning with the graduating class of 2004).
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Whether or not a court will consider this time period to be adequate for purposes
of the IDEA is unclear.
V. CONCLUSION
Although high school exit examinations have been challenged on several
grounds, only two challenges have been successful: those involving situations
wherein inadequate notice was provided, and those involving situations wherein the
examination tested knowledge which had not been, or could not be proven to have
been, taught. 245
Chapter 1 requires that the Superintendent of Public Instruction develop a
statewide high school exit examination, based on the academically rigorous content
standards adopted by the State Board of Education. 6 This examination will be a
graduation requirement for California's high school students beginning with the
graduation class of 2004.247
Because California's high school exit examination will not be a requirement for
graduation until the year 2004,2' schools will have repeated opportunities,
beginning in the fall of 2000, to give students notice of this graduation
requirement. 249 Therefore, any student challenges to Chapter 1 on the basis of
inadequate notice are unlikely to be successful.
However, the issue of curriculum validity may provide fodder for those wishing
to have a court declare Chapter 1 invalid. ° As State Superintendent of Public
Instruction Delaine Eastin herself has indicated, not all school districts have
adopted the State's rigorous academic standards.5' These are the exact standards
that the high school exit examination will test.22 Perhaps, then, some California
students will indeed confront test items which they have not been taught in their
high school curricula. 5 3 For these students, the test will lack curricular validity.5
Nevertheless, if school districts develop remedial courses designed around
"gaps" in their own local curricula, and if they repeatedly offer students who fail
any section of the test opportunities to take such courses, courts may not be
245. See supra Part IV.A.2.a.i-ii (describing successful challenges to high school exit examinations ba.ed
on inadequate notice and lack of curriculum validity).
246. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(a) (enacted by Chapter 1).
247. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60851(a) (enacted by Chapter 1).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 48980(e) (amended by Chapter 1).
250. Love & Weintraub, supra note 16, at A01.
251. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting that soni schools in California may not be
following the state-adopted curriculum standards)
252. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(a) (enacted by Chapter 1) (indicating that the high school exit
examination will be in accordance with the statewide, academically rigorous standards).
253. Sge supra note 158 and accompanying text (observing that some California student-. may not have been
exposed to the state-adopted content standards).
254. See supra Part IV.A.2.a.ii (summarizing the concept of curricular validity).
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sympathetic to the claim that the test does not measure what students have been
taught.
55
Chapter 1 is designed to significantly improve the academic achievement of
California's high school students. It is an assurance to the higher education and
business communities that a high school diploma is not just a piece of paper, but a
guarantee of a specified level of knowledge and skills. Chapter 1 sets forth high
expectations for California students. It will help to ensure that high school
graduates are truly prepared for the demands they will face after high school. It is
a much-needed educational reform which promises to improve the quality of
education for all California students.
255. See supra text accompanying note 141 (indicating the ruling in Williams that, because the student took
courses which adequately prepared him to pass the high school exit examination, due process had not been
violated).
2000/Education
The Public School Performance and Accountability
Program: Making the Grade
Mary Nebgen
Code Sections Affected
Education Code §§ 52050, 52050.5, 52051, 52051.5, 52052, 52052.5,
52053, 52053.5, 52054, 52054.5, 52055, 52055.5, 52056, 52056.5, 52057,
52058 (new).
SB I (Alpert); 1999 STAT. Ch. 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 387
II. BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ENSURE
THE QUALITY OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS .......................... 388
A. The Classroom Instructional Improvement and Accountability Act.. 388
B. The Focus Schools Program ................................ 389
C. The California Rewards and Interventions Advisory Committee .... 389
III. CHAPTER 3 ................................................. 390
A. The Academic Performance Index ........................... 391
B. The Immediate Intervention/Underperforming Schools Program ... 392
C. The High Achieving/mproving Schools Program ............... 393
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 3 ...................................... 393
A. The Superintendent of Public Instruction's Assumption of Powers
Formerly Held by Local School Boards and Superintendents ...... 393
B. Funding Source Issues .................................... 394
C. Data Collection Problems that May Impede the Implementation of
Chapter3 .............................................. 395
D. The Texas Experience ..................................... 396
V. CONCLUSION ............................................... 397
386
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
There are greater, more certain, and more immediate penalties in the
country for serving up a single rotten hamburger in a restaurant than for
repeatedly furnishing a thousand children with a rotten education.'
I. INTRODUCTION
With 1994 federal test scores ranking California's students last in the nation in
reading, tied only with Louisiana students,2 California legislators have become
concerned-and with good reason. In response to such statistics, legislators have
reduced class sizes, added school days, and increased educational spending.3
Despite these acts, 1998 test results show California fourth graders ranked forty-
ninth, ahead only of fourth graders in Hawaii.
To improve school performance, Governor Gray Davis called a special session
of the California Legislature in early 1999.5 The Governor's proclamation calling
for this session specified that the Legislature should consider ways to hold schools
accountable for student learning.6 Chapter 3 is a result of that special session. The
new law establishes the Public School Performance and Accountability Program,
consisting of the statewide Academic Performance Index, the Immediate
InterventionlUnderperforming Schools Program, and the High Achieving/
Improving Schools Program.7 Chapter 3 creates a comprehensive accountability
system which includes both incentives for improving student achievement, as well
as sanctions for continually failing to improve student performance.
1. Anthony D. Denma, Jr., Comment, Educational Accountability in Florida: Meaningful Reform or
Marginal Tinkering?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1992) (quoting AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCIANGE
COUNCIL, SOURCEBOOK OF AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATION 20 (1990), and its quotation of William J. Bennett's
address at an annual meeting of the American Legislative Council).
2. See Ed Mendel, Education Overhaul in California, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 21, 1999, at Al
(indicating that the 1994 results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) tests showed
California fourth graders tied for last in reading); see also Julian Guthrie, State Gets F in Reading, FRESNO BEE,
Mar. 5, 1999, at Al (explaining that the NAEP was initiated in 1969, and is taken every few years by a sample
of students in 39 states).
3. Bill Ainsworth, Davis Vows to Weed out Bad Schools, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 7, 1999, at Al;
see also Duke Helfand, California Ranks Second to Last in U.S. Reading Test, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at Al
(indicating that the 1994 test results spurred "billions of dollars in education reforms").
4. Helfand, supra note 3, at Al.
5. SENATE COMMITrEE ON EDUCATION, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1, at 8 (Feb. 10, 1999).
6. Id.
7. CAL EDUC. CODE §§ 52050-52058 (enacted by Chapter 3).
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11. BACKGROUND: PREvIOUS LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ENSURE
THE QUALITY OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS
Prior to the passage of Chapter 3, the voters of California in conjunction with
state legislatures made several efforts to hold schools accountable to parents and the
general public for the academic performance of students.8 These efforts included
the Classroom Instructional Improvement and Accountability Act,9 the Focus
Schools Program,'0 the California Rewards and Interventions Advisory
Committee," and the Conference Committee on Public School Accountability.' 2
The following subparts briefly describe the thrusts of those laws.
A. The Classroom Instructional Improvement and Accountability Act
California voters approved the Classroom Instructional Improvement and
Accountability Act 3 by an initiative measure in 1988. Under the provisions of this
Act, each local school board is required to develop and publicize a School
Accountability Report Card for each school in the school district.' 4 This report card
must include data relative to student achievement, teacher qualifications,
instructional time, dropout rates, class sizes, and student discipline. 15 Although
schools annually have completed these report cards and provided the information
to parents, the lack of a statewide assessment test and the absence of standards to
measure achievement have blunted the usefulness of the information for parents
who wish to compare the academic achievement of their children's schools with
that of other schools. 6
8. See infra Part lI.A-D (documenting historical efforts to increase the accountability of schools for
student achievement).
9. CAL.EDUc.CoDE§ 41200 (West 1993); seealso infra PartlI.A (discussingtheCassroom Instructional
Improvement and Accountability Act).
10. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1335, sec. 1, at 6555-65 (enacting CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52050-52059.7); see also
infra Part 113 (describing the Focus Schools Program).
11. 1996 Cal. Stat. ch. 496, sec. 1, at 94-95; see also infra Part ll.C (focusing on the Rewards and
Interventions Committee).
12. "eeCALIFORNIASCHOOLBoARDsASSOCIATION,BACKGROUNDONPUBLICSCHOOLAcOUNTABILITY
1-2 (1999) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (delineating the history of the formation of the
Conference Committee); infra Part H.D (discussing the results of the Conference Committee's work).
13. School Funding, Prop. 98 (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35256).
14. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35256 (West 1993).
15. Id. § 33126 (West Supp. 2000).
16. Gwynnae Byrd, The Checkered Life of the 'Accountability' BuZwZord, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, at
M6,
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B. The Focus Schools Program
In 1992, the Legislature enacted Chapter 1335.17 Under this now-defunct law,
the Superintendent of Public Instruction was to designate as "focus schools" the
schools with the lowest-performing students. 18 Focus schools were to develop a
school action plan to improve pupil achievement, and were entitled to receive
expert assistance and additional resources to implement the plan. 9 The
Superintendent of Public Instruction was to appoint an outside management
consultant to assist these schools and, in some circumstances, to intervene in the
management of schools which failed to improve performance.2" However, this law
was never implemented, as the Legislature never appropriated funding.2' The Focus
Schools statute became inoperative on July 1, 1998.2
C. The California Rewards and Interventions Advisory Committee
In 1996, the Legislature again tackled the issue of school accountability by
mandating the creation of an advisory committee.23 As a result, the Superintendent
of Public Instruction created and convened the California Rewards and
Interventions Advisory Committee to develop plans and recommendations "for the
establishment of incentives for the improvement of pupil academic achievement."24
In November 1997, the Advisory Committee published a report, Steering by
Results,2 proposing the implementation of a statewide school accountability system
and a comprehensive program of rewards and interventions for California schools
and students.26
During the 1998 regular session of the Legislature, legislators introduced a
number of bills that took varying approaches to public school accountability,'
17. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1335, sec. 1, at 6555-6565 (enacting CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52050-52059.7).
18. Id. at 6557 (enacting CAL EDUC. CODE § 52055).
19. Id. (enacting CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52055, 52056.5).
20. Id. (enacting CAL EDUC. CODE § 52058).
21. See SENATE COMMrrE ON EDUCATION, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1, at 1 (Feb. 17, 1999)
(indicating that the statute was never implemented because funds for it were never appropriated).
22. See 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1335, sec. 1, at 6564 (enacting CAL EDUC.CODE § 52059.7) (making the Focus
Schools statute inoperative on July 1, 1998).
23. 1996 Cal. Stat. ch. 496, sec.1, at 94-95. While the Legislature mandated the creation of the Committee,
the mandate appeared in an uncodified portion of the statute. Id.
24. THE REWARDS AND INTERVENTIONS ADVISORY COMMITIEE, STEERING By RESULTS: A HIGH-STAKES
REWARDS AND INTERVENTIONS PROGRAM FOR CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS I (1998) (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
25. Id.
26. Id.; see also John Gittelsohn, Results Could Mean Rewards, Punishment, ORANGECOUNTY REG., July
22, 1998, at A09 (describing the Advisory Committee's recommendations).
27. See, e.g., AB 2530 (1998) (as introduced on Feb. 20, 1998, but not enacted) (expanding the focus
schools legislation); SB 1963 (1998) (as introduced on Feb. 19, 1998, but not enacted) (creating a Low Performing
Schools Strike Force to assist with school improvement); SB 1412 (1998) (as introduced on Jan. 15, 1998, but not
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culminating in the creation of the Conference Committee on Public School
Accountability.2 Members of the Conference Committee studied other states'
accountability plans, and eventually presented legislators with Senate Bill 1561.29
This bipartisan compromise, developed after months of negotiation, focused on
performance goals for all schools, and ordered the State Board of Education to
adopt a sanctioning process for those schools that did not improve their students'
academic performance.30 However, then-Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the
Legislature's plan3' because it did not provide mandatory punitive sanctions for
schools that failed to improve.3 ' Nonetheless, the Legislature's actions and
momentum set the stage for a comprehensive system of accountability for
California's schools.
1I. CHAPTER 3
Chapter 3 initiates an ambitious and complex accountability scheme which
applies to all of California's public schools. The program, called the Public Schools
Accountability Act of 1999, consists of: (1) a system to rank all of the State's
schools ;33 (2) an intervention program to assist low-performing schools;34 and (3)
a reward program for high-performing schoolsY.3  The Legislature has provided
36ample funding for the program. This Part will address the provisions of Chapter3, while the next Part will provide an analysis thereof.37
enacted) (expanding the school accountability report data requirements); AB 572 (1997) (as introduced on Feb.
27, 1997, but not enacted) (same); SB 305 (1997) (as introduced on Feb. 27, 1997, but not enacted) (expanding
the school accountability report data requirements); AB 1056 (1997) (as introduced on Feb. 7, 1997, but not
enacted) (guaranteeing free transportation to another school for low-performing students whose achievement did
not improve after remedial work); SB 300 (1997) (as introduced on Feb. 7, 1997, but not enacted) (securing for
low-performing students whose scores did not improve after remedial work free transportation to another school).
28. CA11FORNIA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, supra note 12, at 1-2.
29. SB 1561 (1998) (as amended on Aug. 25, 1998, but not enacted).
30. Id. (as amended on Aug. 25, 1998, but not enacted).
31. See Governor's Veto Message, Sept. 24,1 998 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (decrying
the lack of sanctions in SB 1561, and calling the bill a "serious breach of faith for one of the Legislature's most
serious reponsibilities"--the education of children in low-performing schools).
32. Id.; see also School Accountability: Incentives Should Motivate lmprovements, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 7, 1998, at B6 (discussing the provisions of the bipartisan compromise and the reasons for Governor
Wilson's veto).
33. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52052 (enacted by Chapter 3).
34. Id. §§ 52053-52055.5 (enacted by Chapter 3).
35. Id. §§ 52056-52057 (enacted by Chapter 3).
36. See 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 3, sec. 2, at 17 (stating that the Legislature has appropriated
$193,200,000 for the Public Schools Accountability Act. Of that amount, $32,446,000 is allocated from federal
funds, and $160,754,000 will come from the State's general fund.). While the section provides funding for the bill,
the sectioi itself is an uncodified provision. ld.
37. Infra Part IV.
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A. The Academic Performance Index
Chapter 3's new school ranking system is called the Academic Performance
Index (API).38 The API includes, but is not limited to, the schools' standardized
achievement test99 results, student and staff attendance rates, and student graduation
rates.40 Eventually, the achievement test results will include the new high school
exit examination, also enacted during the 1999 Legislative session.41 The API will
be desegregated by gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, special education
status, and English language proficiency.42 Results of achievement tests will
constitute at least sixty percent of the value of the index.43
Each school will be required to improve its API scores by a minimum of five
percent each year.44 However, high-achieving schools will have a choice: they must
either meet the target improvement rate,45 or they must meet performance standards
that have yet to be adopted by the State Board of Education.46
Performance standards define what students must know and be able to
accomplish at various grade levels.47 The State Board of Education voted to contract
with the Harcourt Educational Measurement Company, the developer of some of
the assessment instruments used under the Standardized Testing and Reporting
system, to develop and recommend performance standards.48 Performance standards
for language arts and mathematics will have been adopted by December 31, 1999,
and standards for history, social science, and science will be adopted by December
31, 2000.41
38. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52052 (enacted by Chapter 3).
39. See id. § 60603 (West Supp. 2000) (defining "achievement test" as "[a] standardized test that measures
the level of performance that a pupil has achieved in the core curriculum areas"). The standardized achievement
testing system in California is known to as the STAR (Standardized Testing and Reporting) program.
40. Id. § 52052(a) (enacted by Chapter 3).
41. See id. § 60851(a) (enacted by Chapter 1) (requiring all students to pass a statewide high school exit
examination, beginning in the 2003-04 academic year, in order to graduate from high school).
42. Id. § 52052(a) (enacted by Chapter 3).
43. Id. (enacted by Chapter 3).
44. Id § 52052(c) (enacted by Chapter 3).
45. Id. § 52052(d) (enacted by Chapter 3).
46. Id. (enacted by Chapter 3).
47. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1, at 4 (Mar. 17, 1999).
48. Memorandum from K. Gwen Stephens, Director of Standards, Curriculum, and Assessment Division
of the California State Department of Education, to all California school district and county superintendents (June
2, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
49. Memorandum from K. Gwen Stephens, Director of Standards, Curriculum, and Assessment Division
of the California State Department of Education, to all California school district and county superintendents (Nov.
20, 1998) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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B. The Immediate Intervention/Underperforming Schools Program
Chapter 3 also establishes the Immediate Intervention/Underperforming
Schools Program.4' Schools that score below the fiftieth percentile on the
standardized achievement test will be invited to participate in the program.51
Participation is limited to 430 schools, with no more than eighty-six schools from
each decile falling below the fiftieth percentile.52 If fewer than 430 schools apply
to participate, the Superintendent of Public Instruction will select schools at
random. 3
Participating schools will receive planning grants of $5 0,00 0 .54 Each school
must form a broad-based school-site committee to develop an action plan for school
improvement with the assistance of an external evaluator 5 If the State Board of
Education approves the plan, the State will provide the school with an
implementation grant of up to $200 per enrolled student.5 6 The school district must
match these funds.57 After two years in the program, if the school has met its API
target for both years, the school will receive a monetary or non-monetary award,
according to the provisions of the High Achieving/Improving Schools Program. 8
A school that has not met its performance goals but has demonstrated significant
growth will be allowed to continue to participate in the program for an additional
year.59
On the other hand, the State Board of Education will classify any school that
has failed to show significant growth in the two-year period as a "low-performing
school." 6 In addition, "the Superintendent of Public Instruction [will] assume all
the legal rights, duties, and powers of the governing board with respect to that
school.' If, after a public hearing, the Superintendent of Public Instruction finds
that the principal of the low-performing school failed to take specific actions that
would have helped the school meet its goals, the Superintendent of Public
Instruction will reassign the principal to a different school in the district.6" In
addition, the Superintendent of Public Instruction must take at least one of
following steps: (1) allow the pupils from the low-performing school "to attend any
50. CAL EDUC. CODE § 52053(a) (enacted by Chapter 3).
51. Id. (enacted by Chapter 3).
52. Id. § 52053(b) (enacted by Chapter 3).
53. Id. § 52053(d) (enacted by Chapter 3).
54. I1& § 52053(0 (enacted by Chapter 3).
55. Id. § 52054(a) (enacted by Chapter 3).
56. Id. § 52054.5 (enacted by Chapter 3).
57. Id.
58. Id. §§ 52056, 52057(a) (enacted by Chapter 3); see also supra Part M.A (explaining the Academic
Performance Index target); infra Part IL.C (examining the High Achieving/Improving Schools Program).
59. CAL EDUC. CODE § 52055.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 3).
60. Id. § 52055.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 3).
61. Id. (enacted by Chapter 3).
62. Id.; id. § 52055.5(e) (enacted by Chapter 3).
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public school in which space is available"; (2) "[a]llow parents to apply to the State
Board of Education for the establishment of a charter school" at the site; (3) "assign
the management of the school" to another educational institution; (4) reassign
certificated school employees; (5) "[r]enegotiate a new collective bargaining
agreement at the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement"; (6)
"[r]eorganize the school"; or (7) "[c]lose the school." 63 The Superintendent of
Public Instruction may also appoint a new school district superintendent or suspend
the authority of the local school board with respect to the low-performing school. '
C. The High Achieving/Improving Schools Program
Chapter 3's third aspect, called the High Achieving/Improving Schools
Program, provides rewards for achieving or improving schools.' This program
rewards schools that meet or exceed the API performance growth target and
demonstrate comparable improvement in the academic achievement "of all
numerically significant ethnic and socio economically [sic] disadvantaged
subgroups within the school."66 Monetary awards will be "available on either a per-
pupil or per-school basis"; the amount will be subject to funds appropriated in the
annual budget, and may not exceed $150 per enrolled student.67 Non-monetary
awards may include "classification as a distinguished school, listing on a published
public school honor roll, and public commendations by the Governor and the
Legislature.""
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 3
A. The Superintendent of Public Instruction's Assumption of Powers Formerly
Held by Local School Boards and Superintendents
Before the passage of Chapter 3, local school boards enjoyed broad decision-
making authority, delegated to them by the Legislature.6 This authority included
the power to control programs and activities within the local school districts by
acting through the school board's appointed representative, the school district
63. Id. § 52055.5(c).
64. Id. § 52055.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 3).
65. Id. §§ 52056-52057 (enacted by Chapter 3).
66. Ua § 52057(a) (enacted by Chapter 3).
67. Id. § 52057(b) (enacted by Chapter 3).
68. Id. § 52057(c) (enacted by Chapter 3).
69. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 35010 (West 1993) (requiring that every school district be "under the
control" of a board of trustees). But see State Bd. of Educ. v. Honig, 13 Cal. App. 4th 720, 748, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
727, 750 (1993) (declaring that the Legislature, after having set policies and standards, may delegate authority
to an administrative officer of a State agency).
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superintendent. ° Chapter 3 removes much of that control, as the new law applies
not only to an individual low-performing school, but potentially to the district as a
whole.7' For example, the Superintendent of Public Instruction may assign the
management of a low-performing school to another educational institution,7 allow
students at a low-performing school to attend another school, 73 reassign the
principal or other certificated staff members to another school in the district, 74 or
even appoint a new superintendent. 75 The reaction of local communities may well
be negative, because the actions would be taken not by their local elected
representatives, but by an individual outside the community. Already, at least one
school official has questioned the efficacy of "a bureaucrat [from] Sacramento"
deciding these local issues. 7
6
B. Funding Source Issues
The Immediate Intervention/Underperforming Schools Program section of
Chapter 3 will be implemented using a combination of State and federal funds.77
The funding includes $32 million from the federal Goals 2000: Educate America
Act.78 That Act requires that federal Goals 2000 funds be allocated by the State
Department of Education among schools that apply for the funds on a competitive
basis.79
Chapter 3, on the other hand, provides that, should fewer than 430 schools
apply, the Superintendent of Public Instruction will randomly select schools to
participate in the Immediate Intervention/Underperforming Schools Program.80 In
the event that such random selection takes place, the schools so chosen would not
70. See, e.g., CAL EDUC. CODE § 35026 (West 1993) (giving school boards the authority to employ the
school district superintendent); id. § 35035(c) (West 1993) (affirming that tha power to assign all certificated
employees of the school district is in the hands of the superintendent).
71. See id. §§ 52055.5(c), 52055.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 3) (granting broad powers to the Superintendent
of Public Instruction in the case of schools that do not meet their performance goals within two years of the receipt
of funding).
72. Id. § 52055.5(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 3).
73. Id. § 52055.5(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 3).
74. Id. § 52055.5(c).
75. Id. § 52055.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 3).
76. Daniel M. Weintraub & John Gittelsohn, Education Bills Offer Hope, Fear, ORANGE COUr4TY REG.,
Mar. 22, 1999, at AO (quoting Al Mijares, the Superintendent of California's Santa Ana Unified School District).
But see Jernifer Kerr, Davis' Education-Reform Bills Ok'd; Two More Face Final Approval Today, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Mar. 23, 1999, at A04 (indicating that the California School Boards Association supported the
legislation).
77. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 3, sec. 2, at 17. While section 2 provides the funding for this bill, the section
is an uncodified provision. Id.
78. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-6084 (West Supp. 1999)
(specifying the requirements and funding provisions of the Goals 2000: Educate America Act).
79. See id. § 5889(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999) ("Each State educational agency shall make subgrants,
through a competitive process[,] to carry out the authorized activities ... .
80. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52053(d) (enacted by Chapter 3).
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be chosen on a competitive basis, and thus may not be eligible to receive the federal
funding.81 However, the Goals 2000: Educate America Act includes a provision
allowing a state to apply for a waiver of the requirement that funds be allocated to
schools on a competitive basis.8 2 If California were to apply for and receive such
a waiver, the funds could be used to provide support for the randomly selected
schools.
C. Data Collection Problems that May Impede the Implementation of Chapter 3
Currently, California does not have an electronic record-keeping system to
track three factors used to calculate the API: teacher attendance, student attendance,
and student performance data.83 Developing and implementing such a system will
take several years, because current data for the factors that the API will consider
either are imprecise or do not exist.84 Chapter 3's requirement that local school
districts report such data may be a practical impossibility.8 5 Although test score data
are available, student attendance information is based on estimates of average
attendance.8 6 Moreover, the State does not currently collect any data for teacher
attendance.87 Thus, the implementation of the API may not be possible, at least not
within the timeline required by Chapter 3.88 Without a comprehensive data-
collection system for California's 8,000 public schools, California lacks this
integral element that is in place in successful accountability programs in other
states.89
81. SENATECOMMrrrEEONEDUCATION, COMMrrrEEANALYSiS OFSB 1, at 13 (Feb. 10, 1999).
82. 20 U.S.C.A. § 5891(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
83. See Terri Hardy, School Ranking Problems May HinderReform; No Existing Way to Gather Data, L.A.
DAILY NEwS, Apr. 4, 1999, at N3 (commenting upon the impossibility of gathering accurate data on student and
teacher attendance, dropout rates, and socioeconomic status); Claudia Kolker, Texas Offers Hard Lessons on
School Accountability, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al (indicating that the California Teachers Association
opposed Chapter 3 because a data collection system currently is not in place); Deb Kolars, State Officials to
Demand Straight Talk on Dropout Stats, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 7, 1998, at Al (describing the difficulties
presented by the lack of a comprehensive student data collection system).
84. See Deb Kollars, State Revised System for Counting Dropouts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 8, 1999, at A3
(indicating that a centralized data collection system is "several years and millions of dollars away from
completion"); see also Ed Mendel, Lack of Data May Limit Schools Accountability Program, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Mar. 29, 1999, at A3 (quoting a State Department of Education official as saying that a new student data
collection system could be fully operational, but not until six to eight years from the time of Chapter 3's passage).
85. ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON APPROPRiATIONS, COMMrrrE ANALYSIS oFSB 1, at 6 (Mar. 17, 1999).
86. Id.
87. id.
88. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52052(a), 52052(c) (enacted by Chapter 3) (requiring the Superintendent of
Public Instruction to develop the API and baseline API scores for schools by July 1999).
89. See Mendel, supra note 89, at A3 (emphasizing that all other states with successful accountability
programs have excellent student information systems in place).
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D. The Texas Experience
"The Texas legislature initiated its Public School Accountability System in
1993."90 The system is similar to California's Public School Performance and
Accountability program, and provides for a testing program,9' a school rating
system,92 public notification of results,93 rewards for high-achieving schools, 94 and
sanctions for low-performing schools.95 Texas's student demographics are similar
to those of California,96 which makes Texas's results particularly relevant. Since the
inception of the program in 1993, Texas has experienced dramatic improvement in
student achievement. 97 The percentage of students who pass the Texas Assessment
of Academic Skills has substantially increased, while the school dropout rate has
decreased.95 In addition, that State has documented strong evidence of improvement
on national assessment tests.99 Significantly, African-American, Latino, and low-
income students are improving at a rate greater than that of Texas's general student
population, thus decreasing the gap in achievement levels between these groups and
white students from middle- and upper-income levels.''
90. Joseph F. Johnson, Jr., The Influence ofa State Accountability System on StudentAchievement in Texas,
6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 155, 155 (1998).
91. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.023 (West Supp. 1999) (listing Texas's testing requirements).
92. See id. § 39.051 (West Supp. 2000) (directing the State Board of Education to adopt a set of quality
indicators, and requiring the Commissioner to define "exemplary," "recognized," and "unacceptable"
performances of districts based on these indicators); id. § 39.072 (West 1996) (requiring the State Board of
Education to assign performance ratings to districts and to report this information publicly).
93. See § 39.072 (requiring Texas's Board of Education to assign district performance ratings and to report
the results to the public); id. § 39.073 (West 1996) (requiring a school district to notify property owners and
parents in the attendance area if the school district's performance is rated unacceptable); id. § 39.074 (West 1996)
(requiring an accreditation investigation by the State Department of Education if a district's performance is rated
unacceptable, with a subsequent report to the local school board and the public).
94. See id. § 39.092 (West 1996) (describing the Texas Successful School Award System, which provides
monetary or non-monetary awards for high-achieving or improving schools).
95. See id. § 39.131 (West 2000) (prescribing for low-performing schools or academically unacceptable
school districts sanctions such as the assignment of a state monitor, closing of schools, consolidation of school
districts, and appointment of a new local board to take over the duties of the elected board of trustees).
96. Mendel, supra note 84, at A3. Mendel also indicates that in both states, nearly 40% of the students are
Latino. Id.
97. Kolker, supra note 83, at Al.
98. Johnson, Jr., supra note 90, at 156-57.
99. Id. at 161; see also Julian Guthrie, Educating Gary, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 18,1999, at M6 (noting that
last year in Texas, 80% of the limited-English proficient students tested at grade level, while in California, only
10% of the limited-English proficient students tested at grade level); Helfand, supra note 3, at Al (stating that
since Texas instituted its accountability system, the percentage of Texas students reading proficiently has jumped
to 29%, which is nine percentage points higher than the percentage of California students who read proficiently).
100. Johnson, Jr., supra note 90, at 157-53.
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V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to achieve better pupil performance by creating a
system to hold public schools accountable for academic progress.01 Although the
successes and shortcomings of California's Public School Performance and
Accountability program are yet to be seen, given the experience of Texas, a state
whose student demographic composition is similar to California's,"° Californians
have reason to be hopeful. Texas's strong student performances on State and
national assessment tests indicate that that State's school accountability program
has led to improved pupil performance. 03 If California's accountability program
generates similar results, Chapter 3 will have accomplished its objective of
improving student performance.
101. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52050.5(k) (enacted by Chapter 3) (stating that the Legislature's intent is for
the school accountability system to focus on increasing academic achievement).
102. Text accompanying supra note 103.
103. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the results of the Texas Public School Accountability Program).

